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ABSTRACT  
 
This dissertation analyzes the effects on the stock markets when institutional investors hold 
their client firms’ stocks. The first essay examines the trading impact around earnings 
announcements and the second essay studies the effect on stock liquidity. In the first essay, we 
find that relationship institutions (that have lent/underwritten and hold shares of clients) support 
their clients when these client firms have negative earnings shocks. Their support not only 
mitigates the negative abnormal return around earnings announcements but also reduces the 
post-earnings-announcement-drift, thus, earnings momentum profits. In the second essay, we 
find that client firms held by relationship institutions suffer more from the adverse selection 
problem. As a result, they tend to have higher trading cost, more non-trading days and larger 
price impact of trades. These findings provide general implications for the financial institutions 
literature and the asset pricing literature. On the one hand, inactive institutional relationships can 
be considered a risk factor because supportive institutional relationships can alter stock return 
profiles and smooth out temporary negative shocks. On the other hand, active relationships can 
also create adverse selection and impose negative effects on stock liquidity. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial conglomerates have exerted more influences on the U.S. capital markets after they 
are allowed to combine different business lines. After the breakdown of the walls between 
commercial banking and investment banking, commercial banks are expanding their business 
into asset management, such as mutual funds. Massa and Rehman (2008) show that the private 
information acquired through lending activities facilitates the trading performance of affiliated 
mutual funds. On the other hand, the banking fees collected from client firms can provide 
incentives to support stock prices of their clients to maintain the relationships. Cohen and 
Schmidt (2009) find that mutual fund families distort their portfolio allocations to secure the 
trustee relationship and those family trustees significantly overweight their 401(k) clients’ stocks, 
especially when others are dumping their clients’ stocks. These studies indicate that the effects of 
financial institutions on their clients do not stop at their traditional function as the intermediary 
to channel capital. 
To understand the non-intermediary role of financial conglomerates in the capital markets, 
this dissertation studies the impacts on the stock markets when financial institutions hold their 
client firms’ stocks. We examine the effect of institutions’ trading activities on stock prices 
around earnings announcements of their clients in the first essay. On the second essay, we study 
the influence on the stock liquidity if firms are held by more relationship institutions. To obtain 
broader insight on these issues, we divide all sample companies into two groups. The first group 
(connected firm) has paid banking/underwriting fees to financial institutions within three years 
and its stock is held by the same financial institutions. Meanwhile, these financial institutions are 
classified as “relationship institutions” and the rest of institutions holding this stock are 
“independent institutions”. The second group (unconnected firm) doesn’t have any relationship 
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institution holding it. Therefore, one can view that unconnected firm has no institutions 
overlapping the equity holdings and banking services. 
In the first essay, the empirical study shows that relationship institutions have a great 
influence on the stock performances of their clients around the earnings announcements in 
several ways. First, relationship institutions, on average, support their client firms (connected 
firms) when these firms have negative earnings surprises. Such activities also discourage selling 
pressures from independent institutions. Second, price support from relationship institutions can 
mitigate downward swing of stock prices when their clients have negative earnings shocks. Also, 
the post-earnings-announcement-drifts of connected firms are less pronounced. Third, the price 
support from relationship institutions is more effective than that of independent institutions. 
Relationship institutions tend to support their client firms with lower liquidity when these firms 
have negative earnings shocks. 
In the second essay, we examine the long term influence when firms are held by more 
relationship institutions. We find that, consistent with previous literature, firms with more 
aggregate institutional holdings have better stock liquidity because of better information 
environment. However, because of adverse selection problem, market makers will charge a 
higher bid-ask spread when they are more likely to trade with informed traders. Thus, firms with 
higher relationship institutions’ holdings exhibit a lower liquidity in terms of higher price impact 
measure, larger effective trading cost and more non-trading days. 
This dissertation contributes to literature on financial institutions by studying the 
non-intermediary role of financial institutions in the capital markets with a broad sample of firms 
and a regular earnings announcement event. These findings can provide general implications for 
asset pricing literature. On the one hand, inactive institutional relationship can be considered a 
risk factor because supportive institutional relationship can alter stock return profiles and smooth 
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out temporary negative shocks while firms without such relationship would have incurred the 
price swing. By reducing unnecessary price movements, financial institutions can mitigate the 
noise in the market and enhance the stock prices of their clients.1 On the other hand, active 
relationship can also create the adverse selection problem of the connected firms and cause them 
to suffer from a lower liquidity because market makers would charge a higher spread to 
compensate for the higher probability of informed trading.  
                                                 
1 See Black (1986) regarding how noise can affect the capital market and Arnott, Hsu, Liu, and Markowitz (2008) on 
the positive relation between expected return and noise. See also Sadka (2006) on the role of informed and noise 
traders on momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift. 
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CHAPTER 2 THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION’S DUAL 
HOLDINGS OF DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES AROUND EARNINGS 
ANNOUNCEMENT PERIOD 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 is an important development in the 
U.S. financial services industry since the wall between commercial banks and investment banks 
is officially torn down. Compared to other investors, financial conglomerates have an inherent 
advantage in collecting and processing information. For example, they own resources to gather 
private corporate information from their affiliated banks to improve their investment 
performance. Ivashina and Sun (2007) find that institutional managers use loan renegotiation 
information to trade the stocks and outperform other managers by 8.8% in annualized returns in 
the month following loan renegotiation. Massa and Rehman (2008) show that the private 
information through lending activities facilitates the performances of the affiliated mutual funds.  
On the contrary, the banking fees collected from client firms can provide incentives to 
support stock prices of their clients to maintain the relationship. For example, Cohen and 
Schmidt (2009) show that mutual fund families distort their portfolio allocations to secure the 
trustee relationship. They claim that family trustees significantly overweight their 401(k) clients’ 
stocks, especially when other mutual funds are selling their clients’ stocks. Ellis, Michaely and 
O’Hara (2000) document that market markers within a financial group tend to support the stock 
prices of new IPO firms if they are underwritten by investment banks within the same group. In 
fact, the economic impacts of holding clients’ stocks and providing other banking services have 
attracted many attentions among researchers.2 
                                                 
2 Gorton and Schmid (1998) study the effect of bank equity ownership on firm performance in Germany. Jiang, Li and 
Shao (2008) find that syndicated loans with dual-holder participation have lower loan yield spreads. 
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Although supportive trading for new IPO firms and 401(k) client firms has been 
documented, it is not clear whether such support exists among other firms. More importantly, if 
such support activities exist, how effective they can be given that financial conglomerates have 
more complex incentives and may have to trade against many independent institutions whose 
objectives are to maximize trading profits. To obtain broader insight on these issues, we use a 
comprehensive sample of firms followed by analysts and quarterly earnings announcements as 
events in this study. Specifically, we analyze the stock trading patterns of two different types of 
institutions (relationship institutions vs. independent institutions) surrounding the earnings 
announcements of their client firms.  
Instead of using an infrequent firm event, we use regular quarterly earnings announcements. 
The sample consists of the universe of firms followed by analysts from 1990 to 2004. Essentially, 
we use institutional trading, earnings momentum, and abnormal stock returns surrounding 
earnings announcements to study the impacts of relationship institutions. Earnings surprises offer 
a convenient opportunity to examine institutional trading behavior surrounding the change of 
client firm information. The high and regular frequency also facilitates the analysis in a large 
scale when the business is as usual. It avoids the selection bias since an infrequent event in other 
study is not randomly observed. Findings from our analysis are more general and have broader 
implications not only to financial regulations and institutions but also to asset pricing literature. 
It also captures the long-term nature of relationships between corporations and institutions better 
than infrequent corporate events. 
One major difference between relationship institutions and independent institutions is that 
the former can collect interest revenues and underwriting fees from their clients; thus, trading 
profit is not the only incentive of trading clients’ stocks. Although extant literature has shown 
some information advantages of relationship institutions, their trading behaviors may not be as 
 6
informative as those of independent institutions due to other incentives mentioned above. Given 
the information advantage and additional incentives, it is an empirical question whether 
relationship institutions provide price support to their clients experiencing negative earnings 
shocks (relationship insurance hypothesis) or these institutions will exploit their private 
information from their affiliated banks and shed their holdings prior to bad news (information 
advantage hypothesis).  
The evidence in this study is more consistent with the relationship insurance hypothesis. 
Analysis on institutional trading shows that relationship institutions significantly increase their 
aggregated holdings of connected firms by 0.03% of shares outstanding one quarter prior to 
negative surprises (the bottom quintile of earnings surprises) while independent institutions 
decrease their aggregated holdings by 0.2%. When firms with negative shocks, the average 
number of relationship institutions is 3 and that number of independent institutions is 138. 
Therefore, independent institutions on average outnumber relationship institutions by the scale of 
hundreds for a firm. Such imbalanced numbers indicate that relationship institutions are actively 
supporting their clients’ shares rather than dumping the shares like others when their client firms 
have negative earnings shocks. 
We also find that the post-earnings-announcement-drift is less pronounced when firms with 
relationship institutions. Relationship institutions tend to support their client firms with lower 
liquidity when these firms have negative earnings shocks. Further evidence shows that the price 
support from relationship institutions is more effective than that of independent institutions. To 
mitigate potential sample selection bias, we also examine the price support effect within the 
connected firms and compare the price impact within the connected firms. The magnitude of 
price impact is economically substantial. Relative to similar firms sold by relationship 
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institutions, the difference is $4.41 (based on $100 of pseudo stock price 6 months following the 
announcements).  
This paper contributes to literature on financial institutions by confirming their relationship 
insurance role in the capital markets using a broad sample of firms and a regular and frequent 
earnings announcement event. The findings provide general implications for asset pricing 
literature. Inactive institutional relationship can be considered a risk factor because supportive 
institutional relationship can alter stock return profiles and smooth out temporary negative 
shocks whereas those without such relationship would have incurred the price swing. By 
reducing unnecessary price movements, financial institutions can reduce the noise in the market 
and enhance the stock prices of their clients.   
The remainder of the first essay is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents relevant 
literature and develops the hypothesis. Section 2.3 describes the sources of data and research 
design. Section 2.4 reports the empirical results and Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1 Literature Review 
2.2.1-1 Institutional Investor and Earnings Announcement  
Whether sophisticated institutional investors have more information and own skills to select 
stocks with abnormal return is an interesting topic in the literature. Many researches study this 
question around earning announcements period. For example, Ali, Durtschi, Lev and Trombley 
(2004) find an association between quarterly change in institutional ownership and abnormal 
returns of the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement. Baker, Litov, Watchter and Wurgler 
(2009) document that the average mutual fund’s recent buys significantly outperform its recent 
sells around subsequent earnings announcements and that mutual fund trades can forecast EPS 
surprises. Berkman and McKenzie (2009) study daily trading data of institutional investors and 
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short sellers prior to the earnings announcements and find that pre-announcement trading has 
significant explanatory power to the upcoming earnings announcement. These evidences are 
consistent with the notion that institutional investors have better information about firms’ 
earnings announcements.  
On the contrary, Griffin, Shu and Topaloglu (2008) examine whether institutional investors 
can trade in the correct direction immediately prior to large value-relevant events, such as 
takeovers, earnings announcements, or other large price moves. Surprising, they find no evidence 
that institutional trading shows superior information about the forthcoming earnings 
announcements. Daske, Richardson and Tuna (2005) study the daily transaction data of short 
seller and find no reliable evidence that daily changes in short sales transactions lead daily stock 
returns. Although the empirical evidence whether institutional investors can time the market is 
mixed, it is generally believed that institutional investors have better ability to collect and 
process information. 
2.2.1-2 Relationship and Support Behavior   
The passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 has great influence on the 
development of the U.S. financial institutions. Although the process has been started in 1987, 
commercial banks did not acquire significant underwriting business until the rule was further 
relaxed since 1996 (Lown, Osler, Strahan and Sufi, 2000). Besides the newly developed 
combined underwriting and lending, commercial banks and investment banks have invested in 
their clients’ stocks for years. Financial institutions have advantages in acquiring and producing 
information on their client firms by developing close relationships. By exploiting economies of 
scale and scope, financial institutions can accumulate private information about their clients and 
share the information between different divisions. 
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With the expansion of commercial banks into mutual funds, the economic impacts of 
holdings client stocks and providing other banking services have attracted renewed attention 
among researchers. Among them, Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) specifically examine the 
price support activities of IPO underwriters. They find that market markers within a financial 
group tend to support the stock prices of IPO firms if those firms are underwritten by investment 
banks within the same group. Cohen and Schmidt (2009) find that mutual fund families distort 
their portfolio allocations to secure a trustee relationship and those family trustees significantly 
overweight their 401(k) clients’ stocks. This phenomenon is more pronounced when the conflict 
of interest of the trustee family is more severe and when other mutual funds are selling the client 
firm’s stock. 
Institutional investors have incentives to maintain good relationship with their customers to 
secure the potential business. For example, Reuter (2006) documents a robust positive 
correlation between the annual brokerage payments that mutual fund families make to lead 
underwriters and the IPO allocations to mutual funds. This study shows that the strength of the 
business relationships with lead underwriters is an economically significant determinant of how 
IPOs are allocated across institutional investors. Ferreira and Matos (2009) also find that strong 
bank-firm relations (board seats, direct equity stakes or through institutional holdings) increase 
banks’ probability of being picked as lead arrangers than banks without such representation. 
Furthermore, these banks with influence in firm’s governance also gain by having less credit risk 
subsequent to loan initiation. 
2.2.1-3 Information Advantage from Combined Business   
Another strand of studies focuses on the information advantage of combined business lines. 
Through underwriting or lending, banks have the privilege to acquire the private information of 
their clients. Massa and Rehman (2008) find that the mutual funds affiliated with banks increase 
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their portfolio weights in the firms borrowing from these banks following the deal. They show 
that this strategy enhance fund performance by 1.4% per year. Ivashina and Sun (2007) examine 
the stock trading of institutional investors that also hold loans in their portfolio. They find that 
institutional managers participating in loan renegotiations consequently trade on information 
disclosed in the loan market and outperform their comparison group by approximately 8.8% in 
annualized term in the month following loan renegotiation.  
However, Dass and Massa (2006) argue that the privileged position of bank will increase 
information asymmetry and adverse selection for the stocks of those borrowing firms. The 
information disadvantage reduces the incentive of other investors to trade the stocks. They find 
that a more intense relationship between financial conglomerates and borrowing firms increases 
the stock’s illiquidity and the information asymmetry, thus lowering the stock’s trading volume 
and the investment in the firm by institutional investors. 
2.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
In order to study effects on the stock markets when financial institutions hold their client 
firms’ stocks, we focus on the trading behaviors of two types of institutions: relationship 
institutions and independent institutions around their client firms’ earnings announcements. 
Specifically, if a bank has lending or underwriting business with a firm, the bank’s affiliated 
institution is defined as a “relationship institution” of the firm. The firm’s other holding 
institutions whose groups do not have lending or underwriting relations with this firm are defined 
as “independent institution”. For example, if Merrill Lynch underwrote the stocks of IBM in the 
previous three years, the asset management division of Bank of American is IBM’s relationship 
institution. Meanwhile, if J. P. Morgan didn’t have any lending or underwriting relationship with 
IBM but holds the shares of IBM, J. P. Morgan is the independent institution of IBM. 
Furthermore, we divide all firms in our study into two types: “connected firms” and 
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“unconnected firms”. Connected firms (e.g. IBM) are those firms paying banking fees to their 
relationship institutions within three years. Unconnected firms are those firms which do not have 
any relationship institutions holding them now. 
Relationship institutions and independent institutions may have different incentives and 
trading behaviors. It is obvious that the only goal of independent institutions is to pursue capital 
gains. However, relationship institutions, especially those belong to financial conglomerates with 
extensive asset management as well as commercial and investment banking divisions, may 
choose to maintain good relation with the client firms. The banking fees paid by corporate clients 
and future fees provide incentive for them to maintain long-term relationship. Because of 
information asymmetry in the markets, firms suffering from temporary negative shocks may not 
be able to credibly convey information to outsider. Thus, relationship institutions can play a role 
to certify their client firms with such transitory shocks. One possible strategy is to increase the 
equity holdings of client firms because relationship institutions can signal to the market by 
betting on their money in the client firms. If this is true, the price support behaviors should be 
more prominent when client firms experience negative earnings surprises or lack of stock 
liquidity.  
We hypothesize that if price support from relationship institutions can mitigate downward 
swing of their client stock prices surrounding negative earnings surprise, reactions of stock prices 
will be smaller and the post-earnings-announcement-drift will be less pronounced; thus, earnings 
momentum profit will be reduced. These can be summarized into the following hypothesis: 
H1: Compared to unconnected firms, connected firms have smaller earnings momentum and 
higher return with negative earning surprises. Also, relationship institutions will 
increase their positions when their client firms have negative earnings shocks or need 
liquidity.  (Relationship insurance hypothesis) 
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On the other hand, relationship institutions can also choose to exploit their private 
information obtained from their affiliated banks to improve their investment performance. If this 
holds, relationship institutions should dump shares before bad news. Therefore, we can have 
another hypothesis: 
H2: Relationship institutions reduce their positions prior to negative earnings shocks of their 
client firms. (Information advantage hypothesis) 
To examine whether the trading behaviors of relationship institutions and independent 
institutions are different around firm’s earnings announcement, we construct a price support 
measure (PS measure) to verify the trading behaviors. This measure is similar to Shu’s (2007) 
positive-feedback measure (MT measure) in price momentum. This price support measure 
captures the extent of buying or selling activities and incorporates the extent of surprises. When 
firm has positive earnings surprise, a larger PS measure means “strong buy” from institutions. 
On the contrary, for negative surprises, a smaller PS measure (more negative number) indicates 
“strong buy” when earnings surprise is very negative.  
We calculate the PS measures from relationship and independent institutions and examine 
whether their impacts on stock price or liquidity are different. Since the relationship institutions 
have more information and higher incentives to help their client firms, we should expect the 
following hypothesis: 
H3: Trading supports from relationship institutions are more effective than the support from 
independent institutions. 
2.3 Data and Sample Description 
2.3.1 Data 
The sample in this study consists of common stocks listed on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
from 1990 to 2004. Prime, closed-end fund, real estate investment trust (REIT), American 
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Depository Receipt (ADR) and foreign companies are eliminated from this study. The sample is 
constructed from different databases. 
First, the quarterly earnings announcement information comes from the I/B/E/S Summary 
database. Second, stock prices, returns, and shares outstanding are obtained from the daily and 
monthly CRSP database. Third, firm characteristics information is from the Compustat database. 
Fourth, quarterly institutional holding data are extracted from the CDA/Spectrum database. All 
institutions’ positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 must be disclosed to the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and CDA/Spectrum collects information from these filings. 
Fifth, the bond and equity underwriting information come from Thomson Financial 
SDC/Platinum new issues database. Because there are many mergers and acquisitions during the 
sample period, the M&A activities are gathered from Thomson Financial SDC/Platinum merger 
and acquisition database to link institutions overtime correctly. The last database is the Reuter’s 
LPC Dealscan database, which contains the loan deal and lender information.  
The information of relationship bank equity holdings is constructed by merging the lenders 
from LPC and/or underwriters from SDC/Platinum to the institutions in CDA database3. They 
include more than 10,000 institution names from CDA and about 10,000 lender and underwriter 
names. Those names are corrected for parent holding company names by incorporating M&A 
information. Because the enormous amount of efforts required to hand check institution 
information, we only focus on those with brokerage services4, which should include most of the 
financial conglomerates. Next, these data are merged with the I/B/E/S, CRSP and Compustat 
data by “cusip”. The final step is to compute the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) for 
each firm in the merged data.  
                                                 
3 I appreciate Wei-Ling Song for providing the merged relationship institution data. 
4 Banks without brokerage services are unlikely to exert more impacts on client firms than these major financial 
institutions. 
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Based on the most recent earning surprise, we calculate every firm’s standardized 
unexpected earnings (SUE) for each quarter as the standard practice in post-earnings 
announcement drift literatures. Earnings momentum, or the post-earnings announcement drift, is 
first documented by Ball and Brown (1968). In the study of earnings momentum, most studies 
typically measure earnings momentum with the standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). SUE is 
defined as: 
 
 quarterseight prior  in the change earnings ofdeviation  Standard
earningsquarterly  Expected -earningsQuarterly =SUE      (2.1) 
Previous literature use different time series models to estimate the expected quarterly 
earnings. Although most papers assume that the quarterly earnings follow a seasonal random 
walk with the drift, the specifications of the growth in the same fiscal quarter are different in 
these studies. For example, some studies assume that quarterly earnings grow at a constant rate 
(Jones and Litzenberger, 1970; Latane and Jones, 1979). Some studies assume that earnings grow 
as an AR (1) model (Bernard and Thomas, 1989). Others assume that earnings grow at a zero rate 
(Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996). However, the robustness of the result in the literatures 
indicates that the accuracy of the earnings expectation model is not particularly important for the 
purpose of measuring unexpected earnings to predict returns (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001).  
We follow the method of Chordia and Schivakumar (2006) to construct SUE, which is 
defined as real earnings minus expected earnings (reported earnings four quarters ago) and is 
standardized by the standard deviation of the earnings change in the prior eight quarters. They 
use standard deviation as the denominator rather than other variables such as the stock price, 
market capitalization, total assets or sales because these variables may proxy for size or expected 
returns (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2006). We construct the SUE from the combined data and the 
sample consists of 107,792 firm-quarter announcements from 1990 to 2004.  
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We use traditional event study to test whether the abnormal return around earnings 
announcement is different between stocks with relationship institutional holdings (connected 
firms) and stocks without relationship institutional holdings (unconnected firms). The abnormal 
returns of the announcement period are computed from the market model. Specifically, for each 
announcement, we use the data from the estimation period (from days -255 to days -10) to 
estimate the beta from the following equation: 
)( ftmtiiftit RRRR −+=− βα               (2.2) 
where Rit, Rmt and Rft is the daily return of stock i, the return of CRSP value-weighted index and 
the risk-free rate on day t. 
For each quarter, we run the Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional regression to study the stock 
behavior around the earnings announcement. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR -1, +1 or CAR0, 2). The full model can be expressed as following: 
  iiiiiii
iiiii
ereturnCumStdevNumestErrAgeSUE
MBSizeRe_numrelaDumCAR
+++++++
++++=
_           
)/(_
1098765
43210
ββββββ
βββββ
    (2.3)
 
The definitions of independent variables are: 
Dum_rela: equal to 1 when the firm is a connected firm and 0 when the firm is unconnected. 
Re_num: the number of relationship institution 
Size: firm’s log market value at the end of each quarter prior to its earnings announcement. 
B/M: book value divided by market value in each quarter prior to earnings announcements. 
SUE: current quarter’s standardized unexpected earnings.  
Age: the number of year that the firm has record in the CRSP.  
Err (forecast error): actual earnings per share minus the consensus of analysts’ forecast right 
before the announcement deflated by the stock price at the end of each 
quarter prior to the earnings announcement. 
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Numest: number of analyst followings before the announcement. 
Stdev (forecast dispersion): standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast.  
Cum_return: three-month cumulative return before the announcement. 
To verify whether our results are robust to different setting of abnormal return, we also 
compute market-adjusted return as the abnormal return and investigate whether the result is 
unchanged. In the robust check, we define the abnormal return as the following equation: 
mtitti RRAR −=,               (2.4) 
where the abnormal return is the difference between the daily return of stock i and the value 
weighted average return for the market. We compute the cumulative abnormal return and run the 
regression model again and the result is similar to the market model. 
2.3.2 Description of the Sample 
Table 2.1 provides the description statistics of sample firms in this study. We divide all 
announcements into two groups (connected vs. unconnected firms) depending on whether a 
firm’s stock is held by its relationship institutions around quarterly earnings announcement. 
Compared to unconnected firms, connected firms are larger and followed by more analysts. They 
also have higher standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), better earning per share, and smaller 
book-to-market ratios. In order to test whether market reacts to positive and negative earnings 
surprises differently, we divide all announcements into two categories based on the sign of 
standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). Firms exhibit more positive earnings surprises in this 
period. The firm characteristics are significantly different between positive surprises group and 
negative surprises group.  
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 show the stock price reactions in positive surprises and negative 
surprises respectively. In both graphs, connected firms appear to have moderate stock reactions 
surrounding earnings announcement and it is particularly obvious for the negative surprises. 
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics 
 All announcements Positive earnings surprise Negative earnings surprise 
 connected unconnected Difference connected unconnected Difference connected unconnected Difference 
SUE 0.463 0.406 0.057*** 1.120 1.024 0.096*** -0.934 -0.883 -0.051*** 
Err 0.013 0 0.013*** 0.032 0.026 0.006*** -0.043 -0.148 0.105*** 
B/M 0.453 0.512 -0.059*** 0.399 0.461 -0.062*** 0.570 0.631 -0.061*** 
Size 1144.23 301.42 842.81*** 1371.27 370.74 1000.53*** 797.51 202.65 594.86*** 
Cash ratio 0.050 0.074 -0.024*** 0.052 0.076 -0.024*** 0.046 0.070 -0.024*** 
ROA 0.039 0.042 -0.003*** 0.050 0.056 -0.005*** 0.021 0.021 0.000 
Capital_exp 0.050 0.052 -0.002*** 0.053 0.057 -0.004*** 0.045 0.046 -0.001* 
Div_yield 0.6% 0.7% -0.1%*** 0.6% 0.8% -0.2%*** 0.6% 0.5% 0.1%*** 
Numest 7 3 4*** 7 4 3*** 6 3 3*** 
EPS 0.230 0.180 0.050*** 0.280 0.220 0.060*** 0.115 0.085 0.030*** 
Pct 61.35% 44.88% 16.47%*** 62.85% 46.59% 16.26%*** 58.42% 41.61% 16.81%*** 
Rela_pct 1.10% 0.00% 1.10%*** 1.15% 0.00% 1.15%*** 1.03% 0.00% 1.03%*** 
Nonrela_pct 58.86% 44.88% 13.98%*** 60.32% 46.59% 13.73%*** 55.78% 41.61% 14.17%*** 
Avepct 0.48% 0.80% -0.32%*** 0.46% 0.76% -0.30%*** 0.53% 0.88% -0.34%*** 
Averelapct 0.32% 0% 0.32%*** 0.33% 0% 0.33%*** 0.30% 0% 0.30%*** 
Avenonrelapct 0.48% 0.80% -0.32%*** 0.46% 0.75% -0.30%*** 0.53% 0.88% -0.34%*** 
# of observations 58058 49734  38231 32855  19827 16879  
This table reports the Median statistics for the sample of 107,792 firm-quarters from March 1990 to December 2004 in the study of earnings 
announcement. All firms are divided into connected and unconnected firms depending on whether their shares are held by relationship institutions 
whose affiliated banks have lending or underwriting relation with them in the previous three years. Furthermore, all announcements are divided 
into positive and negative earnings surprises depending on the sign of SUE defined as 
 quarterseight prior  in the change earnings ofdeviation  Standard
earningsquarterly  Expected -earningsQuarterly =SUE  
where the expected quarterly earnings is the earnings four quarters ago. Err (in %) is actual earnings per share minus the consensus of analysts’ 
forecast and is deflated by the stock price at the end of each quarter prior to the earnings announcement. B/M is the book value divided by the 
market value. Size is the market capitalization (in millions). Cash ratio is the ratio of total cash to lagged assets. ROA (return on assets) is income 
before extraordinary items divided by the lagged assets. Capital_exp is the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged assets. Div_yield is the yearly 
dividend yield. Numest is the number of analyst followings before the announcement. EPS is the exact earnings per share, recorded by I/B/E/S. 
Pct is the aggregate percentage holding of all institutions. Rela_pct and Nonrela_pct are aggregate percentage holdings of relationship and 
independent institutions respectively. Avepct is the average percentage holding of all institutions. Averelapct and Avenonrelapct are average 
percentage holdings of relationship and independent institutions respectively. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Positive Earnings Surprises 
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal return of connected and unconnected firms during quarterly earnings 
announcement. Sample contains firms with positive earnings surprises from 1990 to 2004. The abnormal return is 
calculated from the market model and the cumulative return is the sum of abnormal return since day -10. 
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Figure 2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Negative Earnings Surprises 
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal return of connected and unconnected firms during quarterly earnings 
announcement. Sample contains firms with negative earnings surprises from 1990 to 2004. The abnormal return is 
calculated from the market model and the cumulative return is the sum of abnormal return since day -10. 
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2.4 Empirical Result 
2.4.1 Earnings Momentum 
We conduct earnings momentum strategies for “connected” and “unconnected” firms 
respectively. Every month, we divide all firms into connected and unconnected stocks first and 
independently sort them into quintiles based on their SUE ranking from the most recent earnings 
announcements. Firms in Portfolio SUE1 have the lowest SUE and firms in portfolio SUE5 have 
the highest SUE. The positions are held for 3, 6, 9 or 12 months respectively. 
Table 2.2 presents the return on the earnings momentum strategy for holding 3, 6, 9 and 12 
months respectively. In Panel A, the return on the strategy which longs SUE5 and shorts SUE1 is 
a statistically significant 0.93 % (t-value=3.49) per month for unconnected firms. On the contrary, 
the earning momentum for connected firm is not significant in the same period. This finding 
suggests that the stock prices of connected firms have been supported from their relationship 
institutions when negative earnings shocks occur.   
Similar result is observed in the 6-month period. In Panel B, the difference in return between 
the highest and the lowest SUE portfolio in unconnected firms is a statistically significant 0.59% 
(t-value=2.15) per month. However, the return of earning momentum strategy for connected 
firms is insignificant. Furthermore, the return of unconnected firms in 6-month is smaller than 
that in the 3-month period (0.93%), which suggests that the effect of earning momentum 
decreases over time. This is consistent with previous literatures that earnings momentum is a 
short-term phenomenon. Earnings momentum is not significant in the 9 and 12 month periods. 
These results indicate that connected firms have smaller earnings momentum than 
unconnected firms both in 3-month and 6-month periods. The further decomposition shows that 
the return of the lowest SUE portfolio in connected firms is higher than that in unconnected firms. 
This finding is consistent with the relationship insurance hypothesis. Although prior studies have  
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Table 2.2 Earnings Momentum 
                Panel A: 3-month             Panel B: 6-month 
 Connected Unconnected Difference  Connected Unconnected  Difference 
SUE 1 (Lowest) 1.63% 1.04% 0.59%  1.76% 1.20% 0.55% 
 (3.19)*** (2.31)** (2.34)**  (3.42)*** (2.67)*** (2.04)** 
SUE2 1.20% 1.47% -0.27%  1.32% 1.56% -0.23% 
 (2.99)*** (3.44)*** (-1.67)  (3.34)*** (3.70)*** (-1.42) 
SUE3 1.54% 1.83% -0.29%  1.54% 1.83% -0.29% 
 (4.00)*** (4.79)*** (-2.05)**  (4.00)*** (4.72)*** (-2.10)** 
SUE4 1.66% 1.96% -0.30%  1.55% 1.81% -0.26% 
 (4.15)*** (5.31)*** (-1.56)  (3.78)*** (4.98)*** (-1.32) 
SUE 5 (Highest) 1.43% 1.97% -0.54%  1.34% 1.79% -0.45% 
 (3.87)*** (5.89)*** (-4.31)***  (3.62)*** (5.28)*** (-3.83)*** 
H-L -0.19% 0.93% -1.13%  -0.42% 0.59% -1.00% 
 (-0.61) (3.49)*** (-4.46)***  (-1.28) (2.15)** (-3.79)*** 
                Panel C: 9-month             Panel D: 12-month 
 Connected Unconnected Difference  Connected Unconnected Difference 
SUE 1 (Lowest)  1.76% 1.34% 0.42%  1.80% 1.44% 0.36% 
 (3.46)*** (2.98)*** (1.55)  (3.56)*** (3.20)*** (1.33) 
SUE2 1.43% 1.61% -0.18%  1.45% 1.71% -0.26% 
 (3.64)*** (3.87)*** (-1.09)  (3.74)*** (4.12)*** (-1.53) 
SUE3 1.50% 1.81% -0.31%  1.50% 1.77% -0.27% 
 (3.89)*** (4.67)*** (-2.35)**  (3.89)*** (4.58)*** (-2.09)** 
SUE4 1.49% 1.73% -0.23%  1.50% 1.67% -0.16% 
 (3.61)*** (4.82)*** (-1.20)  (3.60)*** (4.66)*** (-0.83) 
SUE 5 (Highest) 1.33% 1.70% -0.37%  1.31% 1.64% -0.34% 
 (3.56)*** (5.00)*** (-3.29)***  (3.51)*** (4.85)*** (-3.02)*** 
H-L -0.44% 0.36% -0.80%  -0.49% 0.21% -0.70% 
 (-1.39) (1.31) (-3.00)***  (-1.60) (0.77) (-2.65)*** 
This table reports the average monthly returns of earnings momentum portfolios for holding 3, 6, 9 and 12 months. 
Each month, all firms are divided into connected and unconnected stocks based on whether they are held by 
relationship institutions. Then, all firms are independently sorted into quintiles based on SUE of the most recent 
earnings announcements. Portfolio SUE1 contains firms with the lowest SUE and SUE5 contains the highest. The 
time-series average monthly returns of holding these portfolios in different periods are presented and t-statistics are 
in parenthesis. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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documented that earnings momentum are more pronounced among smaller firms, this study 
provides one explanation, i.e., lack of support from relationship banks leaves the uncertainty 
from earnings surprises slower to clear.   
2.4.2 Abnormal Returns around Earnings Announcements 
In the previous section, we provide preliminary evidence that the cumulative returns of 
connected and unconnected firms after the earnings announcement periods are different. In this 
section, we use the Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression model to examine the 3-day window 
abnormal return around earnings announcements. Specifically, we run all the announcements 
with the Fama-Macbeth regression every quarter. Then, we separate the announcements into 
positive surprises and negative surprises by the sign of SUE and run the regressions again since 
the reactions to the positive and negative earnings surprises may be different.  
In order to examine whether our result is robust to different definition of cumulative 
abnormal return, we use different periods to compute the three-day cumulative abnormal return. 
The first one begins from one day prior to the announcement date (t=-1, 0, +1) and the second 
one begins from the announcement date (t=0, +1, +2). Because the results are essentially similar, 
we only report CAR (-1, +1) for brevity.  
For each quarter, we run a cross-sectional regression model as equation 2.3. We estimate the 
coefficient of each variable and compute the time-series average of these coefficients over the 
sample period. Table 2.3 presents the correlation matrix between all explanatory variables. The 
correlations are high between Size and Dum_rela, Numest and Dum_rela, and Numest and Size 
respectively. This suggests that connected firms are bigger and have more analyst followings.  
Table 2.4 reports the regression result. Panel A presents the result for all announcements 
when the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return during the period (-1, +1). We 
use different models to estimate the system. It is obvious that the coefficients of Dum_rela in all 
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 Table 2.3 Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables in the Multivariate Regression 
 Dum_rela Re_num Size B/M SUE Age Err Numest Stdev cum_return
Dum_rela 1.00          
Re_num 0.56 1.00         
Size 0.38 0.52 1.00        
B/M -0.06 -0.06 -0.36 1.00       
SUE 0.02 0.03 0.26 -0.25 1.00      
Age 0.09 0.22 0.45 -0.03 0.02 1.00     
Err 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.08 0.04 0.01 1.00    
Numest 0.30 0.42 0.72 -0.21 0.18 0.21 0.02 1.00   
Stdev 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.12 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.03   
cum_return -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.10 0.13 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 1.00 
The table presents the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables in the multivariate regression analysis. The 
definitions of all variables are as follows: Dum_rela is equal to 1 when the firm is a connected firm and 0 otherwise. 
Re_num is the number of relationship institution. Size is the logarithm of firm’s market value. B/M is the book value 
divided by the market value. SUE is the current quarter’s standardized unexpected earnings. Age is the logarithm of 
the year that the firm has record in the CRSP. Err is the forecast error, which is defined by actual earnings per share 
minus the consensus of analysts’ forecast and is deflated by the stock price at the end of each quarter prior to the 
earnings announcement. Numest is the number of analyst followings. Stdev is the standard deviation of analysts’ 
earnings forecast. Cum_return is the three-month cumulative return before earning announcement. 
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models are positive and significant. For example, we find that connected firms have 0.29% 
higher cumulative abnormal return than unconnected firms in Model 3. According to the 
coefficient of Re_num in Model 4, firms with one more relationship investor on average has 
0.08% higher return. This finding is consistent with the relationship insurance hypothesis.  
Panel B shows the coefficients of regression model estimated with positive earnings 
surprise announcements. In Panel B, the coefficient estimates on Dum_rela are all positive and 
significant in all models. For example, the estimated coefficient on Dum_rela is 0.0020 with a 
t-statistic of 2.86 in Model 3, suggesting a higher cumulative abnormal return of 0.2% for 
connected firms in the period (-1, +1). It seems that investors are more optimistic about the 
positive earnings surprises when these companies are held by their relationship institutions that 
know them better. From Model 4, firms with one more relationship can increase 0.07% higher 
abnormal return. 
The result from the regression model shows that market will react to good earnings 
surprises more when a firm is concurrently held by its relationship institutions. This may be 
explained by the certification effect. Literatures show that commercial banks and investment 
banks play certifying roles for their clients since they have particular access to the private 
information. When a firm held by their relationship institutions announces a positive earnings 
surprise, investors will have more confidence in the firm’s continuity of keeping good 
performance. Therefore, investors will be more willing to buy these stocks, resulting in a higher 
abnormal cumulative return. 
Panel C provides the results of the regressions with negative earnings surprise 
announcements. All models’ estimated coefficients on Dum_rela are positive and significant with 
t-statistic higher than 2. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of Dum_rela is 0.0038 with a 
t-statistic of 3.18 in Model 3, which indicates that connected firms have 0.38% higher abnormal 
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return than unconnected firms. From Model 4, firms with one more relationship institution can 
increase 0.04% higher return. These findings confirm that connected firms have smaller price 
impact than unconnected firms with negative earnings shocks. It is consistent with the 
relationship insurance hypothesis. 
There are many interesting findings in our regression models. For example, the estimated 
coefficient of Dum_rela in Model 3 of Panel B is smaller than that of model 3 in Panel C (0.0020 
vs. 0.0038). Thus, the difference of abnormal return between the connected and unconnected 
firm is higher when firms have negative earnings surprises. This finding is consistent with the 
relationship insurance hypothesis, since the relationship institution will tend to support their 
clients’ stock prices when these firms are facing bad earnings shocks, rather than good earnings 
news. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of SUE in Model 3 of Panel B is smaller that that of 
model 3 in Panel C (0.0010 vs. 0.0030). This finding suggests that negative earnings surprise has 
larger impact in the stock price than positive earnings surprise. 
To check the robustness of our finding, we run equation 2.3 again with the Pooled 
Regression and report the result in Table 2.5. The finding is similar to the Fama-Macbeth 
regression and supports the relationship insurance hypothesis. Connected firms have better stock 
performance in the 3-day window around earnings announcements. 
2.4.3 Institutional Holding Changes 
We examine the trading behaviors of relationship institutions and independent institutions 
around each earnings announcement in Table 2.6. We divide all observations into quintiles (Panel 
A) and tertiles (Panel B). In panel A, the quintile 5 contains firms with the highest SUE and 
quintile 1 with the lowest SUE. Table 2.6 show distinct trading patterns for relationship and 
independent institutions when the SUE is at the bottom quintile. Relationship institutions 
significantly increase holdings of connected firms around negative earnings shocks while the 
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Table 2.4 Multivariate Regressions (Fama-Macbeth Model) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: All Announcements     
Dum rela 0.00208*** 0.00251*** 0.00289***  
 (3.45) (4.00) (4.49)  
Re num 0.000776***
 (2.96) 
Size -0.00148*** -0.00164*** -0.00206*** -0.00220***
 (-5.42) (-3.61) (-4.23) (-4.00)
B/M 0.00819*** 0.00770*** 0.0105*** 0.0113***
 (7.03) (5.90) (8.00) (7.96) 
SUE 0.00384*** 0.00325*** 0.00174*** 0.00161***
 (21.19) (16.46) (7.94) (6.85) 
Age 0.00129*** 0.00129** 0.00128*** 0.00104*
 (3.03) (2.52) (2.81) (1.88) 
Err 0.0945*** 0.249***
 (3.53) (5.62) 
Numest 0.000180* 0.000380*** 0.000412***
 (1.98) (3.96) (3.71) 
Stdev -0.00974*** 0.00561 0.0105
 (-2.80) (1.21) (1.46) 
Cum return 0.0546*** 0.0546***
 (24.90) (22.24)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 
N 103887 90594 90589 79118 
Panel B: Positive earnings surprises     
Dum rela 0.00124* 0.00163** 0.00201***  
 (1.72) (2.30) (2.86)  
Re num 0.000737***
 (2.81) 
Size -0.00245*** -0.00289*** -0.00247*** -0.00242***
 (-6.78) (-6.10) (-4.81) (-4.14)
B/M 0.0126*** 0.0130*** 0.0156*** 0.0160***
 (9.38) (8.22) (10.80) (9.99) 
SUE 0.00176*** 0.00151*** 0.000960*** 0.000903***
 (7.61) (6.96) (4.18) (3.60) 
Age 0.000773 0.000829 0.00106* 0.000797
 (1.28) (1.29) (1.81) (1.15) 
Err 0.486*** 0.907***
 (5.30) (6.24) 
Numest 0.000316*** 0.000425*** 0.000418***
 (3.45) (4.30) (3.60) 
Stdev -0.0125* -0.0216* -0.0242*
 (-1.76) (-1.89) (-1.71)
Cum return 0.0506*** 0.0509***
 (19.30) (18.40)
R2 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.09 
N 68792 60881 60879 53483 
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(table 2.4 continued) 
Panel C: Negative earnings surprises     
Dum rela 0.00325** 0.00372*** 0.00377***  
 (2.48) (2.95) (3.18)  
Re num 0.000351*
 (1.73) 
Size 0.00211*** 0.00118** -0.000751 -0.000318
 (6.30) (2.49) (-1.33) (-0.49)
B/M 0.00892*** 0.00770*** 0.00924*** 0.00921***
 (4.92) (3.46) (4.62) (5.46) 
SUE 0.00657*** 0.00650*** 0.00295*** 0.00281**
 (10.30) (9.07) (3.87) (2.49) 
Age 0.000356 0.000713 0.000511 -0.000359
 (0.86) (1.28) (0.92) (-0.33)
Err 0.0652* 0.287**
 (1.87) (2.61) 
Numest 0.000284** 0.000510*** 0.000496***
 (2.12) (3.80) (3.21) 
Stdev -0.000747 0.0123 0.0372***
 (-0.10) (1.64) (3.29) 
Cum return 0.0573*** 0.0546***
 (20.71) (15.82)
R2 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.09 
N 35095 29713 29710 25635 
This table provides the result of Fama-Macbeth multivariate regressions. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-1,+1), 
from the market model. Panel A, B and C are estimated with all earnings announcements, positive earnings surprise and negative earnings 
surprise respectively. Dum_rela is equal to 1 when the firm is a connected firm and 0 when the firm is unconnected. Re_num is the number of 
relationship institution. The definitions of other control variables are as followings. Size is the logarithm of firm’s market value. B/M is the book 
value divided by the market value. SUE is the current quarter’s standardized unexpected earnings. Age is the logarithm of the year that the firm 
has record in the CRSP. Err is the forecast error, which is defined by actual earnings per share minus the consensus of analysts’ forecast and is 
deflated by the stock price at the end of each quarter prior to the earnings announcement. Numest is the number of analyst followings. Stdev is the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast. Cum_return is the three-month cumulative return before earning announcement. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-value and regression intercepts are suppressed for brevity. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Multivariate Regressions (Pooled Model) 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: All Announcements     
Dum rela 0.00251*** 0.00281*** 0.00317***  
 (4.65) (5.11) (5.87)  
Re num 0.000442***
 (5.76) 
Size -0.00168*** -0.00204*** -0.00224*** -0.00252***
 (-7.29) (-7.07) (-7.86) (-7.77)
B/M 0.00603*** 0.00426*** 0.00643*** 0.00641***
 (5.33) (4.71) (6.91) (5.99) 
SUE 0.00381*** 0.00325*** 0.00241*** 0.00240***
 (27.54) (23.57) (17.80) (16.33)
Age 0.00142*** 0.00158*** 0.00203*** 0.00206***
 (4.04) (4.37) (5.69) (5.25) 
Err 0.00517*** 0.00865***
 (2.80) (3.12) 
Numest 0.000188*** 0.000323*** 0.000358***
 (2.83) (4.97) (5.16) 
Stdev -0.00880*** -0.00575*** -0.00770*
 (-3.57) (-2.60) (-1.73)
Cum return 0.0374*** 0.0379***
 (29.04) (26.91)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
N 103887 90594 90589 79118 
Panel B: Positive earnings surprises     
Dum rela 0.00210*** 0.00222*** 0.00271***  
 (3.37) (3.47) (4.29)  
Re num 0.000423***
 (5.03) 
Size -0.00272*** -0.00311*** -0.00292*** -0.00318***
 (-11.29) (-9.11) (-8.68) (-8.47)
B/M 0.0105*** 0.00988*** 0.0125*** 0.0136***
 (9.61) (8.07) (10.17) (9.68) 
SUE 0.00194*** 0.00166*** 0.00152*** 0.00159***
 (11.75) (9.84) (9.20) (8.86) 
Age 0.000875** 0.000928** 0.00166*** 0.00174***
 (2.19) (2.16) (3.92) (3.76) 
Err 0.00459** 0.00693**
 (2.14) (2.21) 
Numest 0.000267*** 0.000350*** 0.000376***
 (3.47) (4.62) (4.66) 
Stdev -0.00466 -0.00535 -0.00993
 (-1.49) (-1.45) (-1.31)
Cum return 0.0343*** 0.0349***
 (21.66) (20.05)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 
N 68792 60881 60879 53483 
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(table 2.5 continued) 
Panel C: Negative earnings surprises     
Dum rela 0.00295*** 0.00377*** 0.00375***  
 (2.89) (3.65) (3.70)  
Re num 0.000305*
 (1.91) 
Size 0.00176*** 0.000762 -0.000293 -0.000141
 (3.99) (1.48) (-0.57) (-0.24)
B/M 0.00571*** 0.00301** 0.00418*** 0.00415***
 (3.34) (2.45) (3.36) (2.97) 
SUE 0.00655*** 0.00623*** 0.00407*** 0.00371***
 (9.89) (9.03) (6.00) (4.99) 
Age 0.000605 0.00130** 0.00134** 0.00120*
 (0.94) (1.97) (2.06) (1.68) 
Err 0.00444 0.00812**
 (1.56) (1.97) 
Numest 0.000284** 0.000447*** 0.000484***
 (2.23) (3.59) (3.63) 
Stdev -0.00901*** -0.00424 -0.00137
 (-2.68) (-1.48) (-0.25)
Cum return 0.0410*** 0.0417***
 (20.20) (19.22)
R2 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.043 
N 35095 29713 29710 25635 
This table provides the result of Pooled multivariate regressions. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return, CAR(-1,+1), from the 
market model. Panel A, B and C are estimated with all earnings announcements, positive earnings surprise and negative earnings surprise 
respectively. Dum_rela is equal to 1 when the firm is a connected firm and 0 when the firm is unconnected. Re_num is the number of relationship 
institution. The definitions of other control variables are as followings. Size is the logarithm of firm’s market value. B/M is the book value 
divided by the market value. SUE is the current quarter’s standardized unexpected earnings. Age is the logarithm of the year that the firm has 
record in the CRSP. Err is the forecast error, which is defined by actual earnings per share minus the consensus of analysts’ forecast and is 
deflated by the stock price at the end of each quarter prior to the earnings announcement. Numest is the number of analyst followings. Stdev is the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast. Cum_return is the three-month cumulative return before earning announcement. Numbers in 
parentheses are t-value and regression intercepts are suppressed for brevity. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% respectively. 
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independent institutions reduce their holdings significantly. The supports of relationship 
institutions to connected firms are also obvious when the buy pattern is compared to the 
significant selling of unconnected firms by independent institutions. When the SUE is at the top 
quintile, significantly buying activities prevail for all categories. In Panel B, we find similar 
supporting behaviors for relationship institutions in the bottom tertile. The findings are consistent 
with the relationship insurance hypothesis, rather than information advantage hypothesis. 
To further study the trading behavior of relationship and independent institutions, we divide 
all announcements into four groups depending on the sign of the two consecutive quarters’ 
earnings surprises (SUE). Table 2.7 shows a significant support of relationship institutions in 
connected firms when SUE turns negative, which is different from the independent institutions. 
Meanwhile, the independent institutions also reduce their holdings in unconnected firms when 
the SUE turns negative. On average, independent institutions tend to sell more unconnected 
firms than connected firms. It is worthy to mention that independent institutions stop selling 
connected firms after they observe the supportive trading behaviors of relationship institutions. 
These findings are consistent with the relationship insurance hypothesis. The different trading 
patterns of independent institutions for connected and unconnected firms also suggest that their 
trading behaviors may be affected by those of relationship institutions.  
2.4.4 Price Support Measure  
In this section, we construct a price support measure (PS measure) to examine institutional 
investors’ trading behaviors around earnings announcement. This measure is similar to Shu’s 
(2007) positive-feedback measure (MT measure) in price momentum. Specifically, we use the 
following procedures to calculate the PS measure. First, we calculate Δholdi,t for every quarter t 
and divide it by ∑
−=
Δ
0
3t
ithold , the total absolute value of institutional trading in the estimated 
period (previous 4 quarters). Second, we calculate the SUEindexit, a discrete index measure 
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Table 2.6 Relationship Trading and Earnings Surprises 
Panel A: Sorting into quintiles (change of % holding) 
 1 (lowest SUE) 2 3 4 5 (highest SUE) 
 connected unconnected connected unconnected connected unconnected connected unconnected connected unconnected 
QTR REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  
[-3,-2] 0.039 ** -0.349 *** -0.436 *** 0.060 *** 0.099  -0.040  0.075 *** 0.483 *** 0.520 *** 0.087 *** 0.775 *** 0.565 *** 0.133 *** 0.563 *** 0.590 *** 
[-2,-1] 0.046 *** -0.192 ** -0.629 *** 0.086 *** 0.183 ** -0.034  0.090 *** 0.751 *** 0.528 *** 0.115 *** 0.859 *** 0.742 *** 0.138 *** 0.683 *** 0.553 *** 
[-1,0] 0.028 ** -0.177 ** -0.693 *** 0.092 *** 0.406 *** -0.116  0.080 *** 0.690 *** 0.453 *** 0.125 *** 0.966 *** 0.626 *** 0.153 *** 0.500 *** 0.428 *** 
[0, 1] 0.046 *** 0.205 *** -0.733 *** 0.102 *** 0.642 *** -0.224 ** 0.112 *** 0.846 *** 0.186 * 0.116 *** 1.168 *** 0.102  0.155 *** 0.568 *** -0.247 ** 
[1, 2] 0.001  0.174 ** 0.541 *** 0.023  0.096  0.507 *** -0.002  0.102  0.785 *** 0.020  -0.011  0.898 *** 0.046 *** -0.490 *** 0.739 *** 
[2, 3] 0.013  0.443 *** 0.430 *** 0.025  0.385 *** 0.513 *** 0.042 *** 0.299 *** 0.356 *** 0.040 *** 0.191 ** 0.405 *** 0.050 *** -0.149  0.225 ** 
[3, 4] 0.025  0.447 *** 0.473 *** 0.013  0.652 *** 0.457 *** 0.068 *** 0.373 *** 0.317 *** 0.041 *** 0.072  0.151  0.052 *** -0.145  0.185 * 
[4, 5] 0.024  0.487 *** 0.489 *** 0.027  0.391 *** 0.318 *** 0.036 ** 0.405 *** 0.336 *** 0.056 *** 0.241 ** 0.278 ** 0.040 ** -0.216 ** 0.195 ** 
QTR 0 2.22  53.67  41.74  2.13  53.48  41.87  2.18  55.87  44.19  2.23  57.44  45.23  2.41  61.10  48.68  
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(table 2.6 continued) 
Panel B: Sorting into tertiles (change of % holding) 
 
1(lowest SUE) 2 3(highest SUE) 
 connected unconnected connected unconnected connected unconnected 
QTR REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  
[-3,-2] 0.048 *** -0.215 *** -0.320 *** 0.076 *** 0.492 *** 0.440 *** 0.112 *** 0.668 *** 0.599 *** 
[-2,-1] 0.053 *** -0.085  -0.428 *** 0.097 *** 0.711 *** 0.490 *** 0.134 *** 0.750 *** 0.632 *** 
[-1,0] 0.050 *** -0.006  -0.539 *** 0.094 *** 0.780 *** 0.416 *** 0.143 *** 0.660 *** 0.538 *** 
[0,1] 0.066 *** 0.389 *** -0.551 *** 0.116 *** 0.841 *** 0.117  0.137 *** 0.824 *** -0.114  
[1,2] 0.010  0.126 ** 0.507 *** 0.007  0.077  0.815 *** 0.036 *** -0.285 *** 0.753 *** 
[2,3] 0.021  0.454 *** 0.475 *** 0.037 *** 0.299 *** 0.384 *** 0.044 *** -0.056  0.298 *** 
[3,4] 0.018  0.565 *** 0.453 *** 0.059 *** 0.316 *** 0.331 *** 0.043 *** -0.055  0.166 ** 
[4,5] 0.028 ** 0.477 *** 0.452 *** 0.033 *** 0.346 *** 0.316 *** 0.048 *** -0.047  0.202 ** 
QTR 0 2.12   53.13   42.36   2.08   54.91   43.68   2.20   58.89   47.50   
This table reports the mean level of holding and change of holdings. All firms are divided into connected and unconnected firms depending on whether their shares are held by 
relationship institutions whose affiliated banks have lent or underwritten for the firms within 3 years prior to the earning announcements. Institutions holding the shares of fees paying 
clients are relationship institutions (REL). The remaining institutions are independent institutions (NON). Connected and unconnected firms are further sorted into Quintiles (Panel A) 
and Tertiles (Panel B) according to their SUE. The last row is the holding level in current quarter (quarter 0) when earnings are announced. Other rows are changes of holdings and 
corresponding windows are denoted in brackets. Earning surprises (SUE) is defined in Table 2.1. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 2.7 Relationship Trading and Consecutive Earnings Surprises 
 
 Pos. SUE followed by Neg. SUE (+, -) Neg. SUE followed by Neg. SUE (-, -) Neg. SUE followed by Pos. SUE (-, +) Pos. SUE followed by Pos. SUE (+, +) 
 connected unconnected connected unconnected connected unconnected connected unconnected 
QTR REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  REL  NON  NON  
[-3,-2] 0.089  *** 0.126   0.139   0.027 ** -0.380 *** -0.542 *** 0.072 *** 0.234  ** -0.073  0.100 *** 0.651 *** 0.635 *** 
[-2,-1] 0.092  *** 0.177   0.027   0.033 ** -0.213 ** -0.654 *** 0.077 *** 0.411  *** -0.046  0.124 *** 0.794 *** 0.682 *** 
[-1,0] 0.049  ** -0.292  ** -0.461  *** 0.050 *** 0.153 ** -0.589 *** 0.096 *** 0.660  *** 0.275 ** 0.124 *** 0.725 *** 0.524 *** 
[0,1] 0.059  *** 0.057   -0.676  *** 0.069 *** 0.532 *** -0.488 *** 0.133 *** 1.108  *** 0.213 ** 0.125 *** 0.758 *** -0.071  
[1,2] 0.030  * 0.069   0.276  ** -0.003  0.161 ** 0.585 *** 0.013  0.088   0.916 *** 0.025 *** -0.167 *** 0.741 *** 
[2,3] 0.024   0.462  *** 0.323  ** 0.024  0.364 *** 0.447 *** 0.008  0.542  *** 0.487 *** 0.049 *** 0.004  0.302 *** 
[3,4] 0.026   0.461  *** 0.390  *** 0.013  0.571 *** 0.458 *** 0.064 *** 0.431  *** 0.135  0.048 *** 0.042  0.282 *** 
[4,5] 0.074  *** 0.521  *** 0.291  * 0.019  0.512 *** 0.407 *** 0.031  0.234  * 0.418 *** 0.045 *** 0.114 * 0.217 *** 
QTR 0 2.09   53.15   43.20   2.12  53.16  41.98  2.01  52.52   40.92  2.18  58.21  47.15  
This table reports the mean level of holding and change of holdings for consecutive earnings surprises. All firms are divided into four groups depending on the consecutive quarters’ 
earnings surprise (SUE). Within each group, firms are further classified into connected and unconnected firms based on whether their shares are held by relationship institutions whose 
affiliated banks have lent or underwritten for the firms within 3 years prior to the earning announcements. Institutions holding the shares of fees paying clients are relationship 
institutions (REL). The remaining institutions are independent institutions (NON). The last row is the holding level in current quarter (quarter 0) when earnings are announced. Other 
rows are changes of holdings and corresponding windows are denoted in brackets. Earning surprises (SUE) is defined in Table 2.1. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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ranking the concurrent SUE for each quarter. Each stock is sorted into quartiles by its SUE and 
assigned a discrete value (-2, -1, 1 or 2) based on SUE. Although Shu (2007) sorts companies 
into deciles according to past stock returns, we simplify his method into quartiles. Finally, for 
each quarter, we multiply the 
∑
−=
Δ
Δ
0
3t
it
it
hold
hold  by SUEindexit and sum up the product across past 
four quarters to obtain the price supporting measure (PS). A higher PS measure when SUE is 
positive means more buying. However, a smaller PS value when SUE is negative indicates a 
higher support from institutions because the SUE is a negative number and holding change is a 
positive number.  
 To study the trading impact of relationship and independent investors, we examine the 
changes of firm characteristics responding to different levels of PS measures. Table 2.8 and Table 
2.9 report the findings for firms with positive earnings surprise and negative surprise respectively. 
This can be regarded as the univariate analysis. Specifically, we construct these tables from the 
following procedures. Every quarter, we sort firms into quintiles based on their PS measure. 
Then, we find firm characteristics prior to and following the PS measure computing period (4 
quarters) and calculate the change. Panel A of Table 2.8 reports the characteristic change for 
different levels of PS measure from relationship investors. We are interested in the change of 
stock liquidity. It is obvious that the turnover and Amihud’s price impact improve more for firms 
with strong buying from relationship institutions. Besides, the analyst following, market value 
and cash ratio also increase more for firms with stronger relationship buying.  
 Panel B of Table 2.8 reports the change of firm characteristic when we sort the firms with 
PS measure of independent investors. The stock liquidity of firms with strong buying improves 
more than that of firms with weak buying. Specifically, these firms have fewer non-trading days 
and the Hasbrouck trading cost reduce more.  
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 The Table 2.9 reports the result for firms with current negative earnings shocks. In Panel A, 
we sort firms with their PS measure from relationship institutions. The stock liquidity worsens 
for every quintile when firms experience negative SUE. However, compared with firms with 
weak support, firms with strong support from relationship institutions deteriorate less in the 
Amihud’s price impact, Liu’s Lm3 measure and Hasbrouck trading cost. In the Panel B of Table 
2.9, we also find that the stock liquidity declines in every quintile for firms surrounding negative 
earnings announcements. Similarly, firms with more buying from independent institutions 
exhibit smaller declines in Amihud’s price impact and Hasbrouck’s trading cost. To summarize, 
we find that both of the buying from relationship institutional and independent institutions help 
to improve the stock liquidity in this univariate analysis. 
The previous univariate analysis shows a relationship between the stock liquidity and 
buying activities from institutional investors. However, the liquidity improvement may be caused 
by changes of other firm characteristics. To clarify this possibility, we run the regression model 
and control other firm characteristics to test the robustness of our findings. Table 2.10 reports the 
result. As in the second essay, we use Amihud’s price impact, Liu’s Lm3 measure and Hasbrouck 
trading cost as the dependent variables respectively in three different regressions. The main 
explanatory variables are the PS measure of relationship institutions (rela_ps) and that measure 
of independent institutions (nonrela_ps). 
Panel A reports the regression result for firms with positive earnings surprise. The negative 
coefficient of rela_ps in Model 1 shows that the buying of relationship institutions reduces the 
Amihud’s price impact and improves the stock liquidity. This is consistent with the previous 
finding in the Panel A of Table 2.8. Similarly, the negative coefficient of nonrela_pct also implies 
a lower price impact for firms with more buying from independent institutions. Although the 
magnitude of coefficient for nonrela_ps (0.0729) seems to be larger than that of rela_ps (0.0208), 
 35
Table 2.8 Price Support and Changes of Firm Characteristics (Positive Surprise) 
This table reports the changes of firm characteristics responding to different levels of PS measures from 
the relationship institutions and independent institutions for firms with current positive earnings surprise. 
The focus is the change of stock liquidity. Each quarter, firms are sorted into quintile based on the 
relationship PS measure (rela_ps) and independent PS measure (nonrela_ps). Price supporting measure is 
calculated with four quarter interval by the following procedures. First, we calculate Δholdi,t for every 
quarter t and divide it by ∑
−=
Δ
0
3t
ithold , the absolute value of institutional trading in the estimated period 
(4 quarters). Second, for each quarter t, we compute the SUEindexit, a discrete index measuring the rank 
of SUE for firm i. Specifically, each stock is sorted by its SUE and assigned a discrete value (-2, -1, 1, 2) 
based on its SUE. Then, for firm i in each quarter t, we multiply the 
∑
−=
Δ
Δ
0
3t
it
it
hold
hold
 by SUEindexit and 
sum up the product across four quarters to obtain the price supporting measure (PS). The first column 
reports the initial firm characteristic of whole sample prior to PS estimated quarters and the rest columns 
report the characteristic changes. The definitions of variables are as followings: turnover is trading 
volume turnover; Amihud is AmiHud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio rescaled by 107 and taken by logarithm; 
lm3 is the Liu’s (2006) LM3 measure; Hasbrouck is Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective trading cost measure; 
sue is the standardized unexpected earnings; err is actual earnings per share minus the consensus of 
analysts’ forecast and is deflated by the stock price at the end of each quarter prior to the earnings 
announcement; numest is the number of analyst followings before the announcement; stdev is the 
standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast; 3m_return is the accumulated stock return; var_return is 
the variance of return in previous quarter; EPS is the exact earnings per share, recorded by I/B/E/S; 
Capital_exp is the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged assets; ROA is income before extraordinary 
items divided by the lagged assets; held_pct is the aggregate institutional holding; rela_pct is the 
aggregate holdings of relationship institutions; num_institution is the total number of institutional 
investors; num_rela is the number of relationship institutional investors; herfin is the Herfindahl index; 
B/M is the book value divided by the market value; mkt_value is the market value (in millions); cashratio 
is the ratio of total cash to lagged assets; leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity 
plus the book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; advertising is advertising expense 
divided by total asset; div_yield is the yearly dividend yield. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the 
symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Panel A: Sorted by relationship PS measure 
Value change  
 
Average 
initial 
value 1(Weak) 2 3 4 5(Strong) S-W  
turnover 0.348 0.040 0.064 0.038 0.058 0.051 0.011 ** 
Amihud -2.630 -0.403 -0.441 -0.486 -0.421 -0.444 -0.042 ***
lm3 0.311 -0.027 -0.008 -0.166 -0.016 -0.028 -0.001  
Hasbrouck (*100) 0.520 -0.030 -0.049 -0.047 -0.031 -0.030 0.000  
sue 0.908 0.514 0.609 0.519 0.505 0.558 0.044  
err -0.274 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.003  
numest 7.623 0.430 0.617 0.314 0.533 0.582 0.152 ***
stdev 0.029 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 ***
3m_return 0.071 -0.018 -0.044 -0.014 -0.041 -0.029 -0.011 ** 
var_return (*100) 0.091 -0.007 -0.011 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 0.006 ** 
EPS 0.221 0.122 0.137 0.096 0.116 0.116 -0.005  
Capital_exp (*100) 1.745 0.001 -0.037 0.049 -0.022 0.008 0.007  
ROA 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001  
held_pct 53.3% 2.6% 3.7% 3.0% 3.8% 3.3% 0.7% ***
rela_pct 1.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.6% ***
num_institution 152.6 22 27 17 29 31 9 ***
num_rela 2.4 0.505 0.581 0.052 0.980 1.108 0.603 ***
herfin 203 8.957 14.232 9.211 14.316 5.832 -3.124  
B/M 0.545 -0.036 -0.040 -0.061 -0.025 -0.036 0.001  
mkt_value 4813 955 856 783 1608 2310 1355 ***
cashratio 0.158 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.008 0.012 ***
leverage 0.560 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.003 ***
advertising (*100) 0.012 -0.025 0.012 -0.046 0.016 -0.033 -0.008  
div_yield 0.016 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001  
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(table 2.8 continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by independent PS measure 
Value change  
 
Average 
initial 
value 1(Weak) 2 3 4 5(Strong) S-W  
turnover 0.348 0.034 0.033 0.037 0.052 0.074 0.040  
Amihud -2.630 -0.367 -0.385 -0.417 -0.478 -0.592 -0.225  
lm3 0.311 -0.063 -0.060 -0.069 -0.074 -0.109 -0.046 ** 
Hasbrouck (*100) 0.520 -0.037 -0.038 -0.032 -0.037 -0.046 -0.009 * 
sue 0.908 0.477 0.485 0.546 0.567 0.587 0.110 ***
err -0.274 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.001  
numest 7.623 0.512 0.430 0.441 0.404 0.465 -0.048  
stdev 0.029 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.001  
3m_return 0.071 -0.016 -0.018 -0.028 -0.030 -0.029 -0.013 ** 
var_return (*100) 0.091 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 0.002  
EPS 0.221 0.099 0.113 0.111 0.116 0.120 0.021 ***
Capital_exp (*100) 1.745 -0.060 -0.003 0.028 0.033 0.062 0.122 ***
ROA 0.011 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001  
held_pct 53.3% 0.7% 2.4% 2.7% 4.4% 5.7% 5.0% ***
rela_pct 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% -0.2% ***
num_institution 152.6 22 22 23 23 26 4 ***
num_rela 2.4 0.648 0.578 0.503 0.480 0.465 -0.184 ***
herfin 203 1.545 6.541 6.757 14.639 18.844 17.298 ***
B/M 0.545 -0.027 -0.031 -0.050 -0.049 -0.064 -0.038 ***
mkt_value 4813 1538 1204 1014 1221 1263 -276 ** 
cashratio 0.158 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.011 ***
leverage (*100) 0.560 0.403 0.116 0.148 0.202 0.372 -0.031  
advertising (*100) 0.012 -0.039 -0.027 -0.016 -0.015 -0.029 0.011  
div_yield 0.016 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002  
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Table 2.9 Price Support and Changes of Firm Characteristics (Negative Surprise) 
This table reports the changes of firm characteristics responding to different levels of PS measures from 
the relationship institutions and independent institutions for firms with negative earnings surprise. The 
focus is the change of stock liquidity. Each quarter, firms are sorted into quintile based on the current 
relationship PS measure (rela_ps) and independent PS measure (nonrela_ps). The first column reports the 
initial firm characteristic of whole sample prior to PS measures and the rest columns report the 
characteristic changes of firms under different PS measures. The definitions of variables are as followings: 
turnover is trading volume turnover; Amihud is AmiHud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio rescaled by 107 and 
taken by logarithm; lm3 is the Liu’s (2006) LM3 measure; Hasbrouck is Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective 
trading cost measure; sue is the standardized unexpected earnings; err is actual earnings per share minus 
the consensus of analysts’ forecast and is deflated by the stock price at the end of each quarter prior to the 
earnings announcement; numest is the number of analyst followings before the announcement; stdev is 
the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast; 3m_return is the accumulated stock return; 
var_return is the variance of return in previous quarter; EPS is the exact earnings per share, recorded by 
I/B/E/S; Capital_exp is the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged assets; ROA is income before 
extraordinary items divided by the lagged assets; held_pct is the aggregate institutional holding; rela_pct 
is the aggregate holdings of relationship institutions; num_institution is the total number of institutional 
investors; num_rela is the number of relationship institutional investors; herfin is the Herfindahl index; 
B/M is the book value divided by the market value; mkt_value is the market value (in millions); cashratio 
is the ratio of total cash to lagged assets; leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity 
plus the book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; advertising is advertising expense 
divided by total asset; div_yield is the yearly dividend yield. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the 
symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Panel A: Sorted by relationship PS measure 
Value change  
 
Average 
initial 
value 5(Strong) 4 3 2 1(Weak) S-W  
turnover 0.413 -0.033 -0.032 -0.034 -0.036 -0.034 0.001  
Amihud -2.492 0.049 0.107 0.179 0.240 0.221 -0.172 ***
lm3 0.271 -0.014 0.020 0.086 0.034 0.028 -0.042 ***
Hasbrouck (*100) 0.006 -0.001 -0.006 0.006 -0.002 0.023 -0.023 ***
sue 0.573 -1.105 -1.127 -1.011 -1.162 -1.196 0.091 ** 
err 0.003 -0.008 -0.022 -0.015 -0.010 -0.009 0.001  
numest 7.248 -0.090 -0.001 -0.210 -0.328 -0.165 0.075  
stdev 0.036 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.011 0.008 -0.001  
3m_return 0.000 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.042 0.066 -0.025 ***
var_return (*100) 0.111 -0.001 -0.005 0.007 -0.003 0.009 -0.010 ** 
EPS 0.332 -0.197 -0.193 -0.180 -0.217 -0.216 0.018  
Capital_exp (*100) 0.020 -0.493 -0.447 -0.403 -0.528 -0.467 -0.026  
ROA 0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 0.003 ***
held_pct 53.50% 1.47% 0.92% -0.35% -0.20% -1.23% 2.71% ***
rela_pct 1.33% 0.86% 0.54% 0.02% -0.17% -0.53% 1.39% ***
num_institution 140.5 -1.142 -1.403 -3.326 -4.350 -6.617 5.474 ***
num_rela 2.7 0.957 0.794 0.066 0.283 0.085 0.873 ***
herfin 214 27.444 28.225 18.431 27.389 20.748 6.696 * 
B/M 0.593 0.093 0.140 0.097 0.182 0.150 -0.057 ***
mkt_value 3798 -348 -542 -445 -707 -616 268 * 
cashratio 0.188 -0.015 -0.032 -0.020 -0.052 -0.035 0.020 ***
leverage 0.531 0.013 0.009 0.005 0.014 0.010 0.003 * 
advertising (*100) 0.010 -0.018 -0.021 -0.049 0.041 -0.012 -0.006  
div_yield 0.016 0.111 -0.547 0.105 0.152 0.127 -0.016  
 40
(table 2.9 continued) 
Panel B: Sorted by independent PS measure 
Value change  
 
Average 
initial 
value 5(Strong) 4 3 2 1(Weak) S-W  
turnover 0.413 -0.038 -0.028 -0.036 -0.036 -0.031 -0.007  
Amihud -2.492 0.037 0.072 0.132 0.214 0.350 -0.312 ***
lm3 0.271 0.021 0.034 0.052 0.037 0.049 -0.028  
Hasbrouck (*100) 0.006 -0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.020 -0.024 ***
sue 0.573 -1.171 -1.028 -1.016 -1.076 -1.220 0.049  
err 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.017 -0.018 -0.019 0.014 ***
numest 7.248 0.021 -0.136 -0.119 -0.174 -0.418 0.439 ***
stdev 0.036 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.015 -0.007 ***
3m_return 0.000 0.044 0.040 0.035 0.044 0.065 -0.021 ** 
var_return (*100) 0.111 -0.007 0.000 -0.001 0.004 0.018 -0.025 ***
EPS 0.332 -0.164 -0.161 -0.188 -0.204 -0.268 0.105 ***
Capital_exp (*100) 0.020 -0.494 -0.386 -0.439 -0.439 -0.526 0.033  
ROA 0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.013 0.005 ***
held_pct 53.50% 4.07% 2.29% 0.57% -1.65% -5.40% 9.47% ***
rela_pct 1.33% 0.02% 0.11% 0.15% 0.23% 0.13% -0.11% * 
num_institution 140.5 -1.222 -1.380 -2.834 -4.251 -7.462 6.240 ***
num_rela 2.7 0.388 0.421 0.385 0.406 0.296 0.092 ** 
herfin 214 50 34 21 13 -4 54 ***
B/M 0.593 0.065 0.075 0.112 0.152 0.223 -0.157 ***
mkt_value 3798 -499 -493 -636 -375 -536 36  
cashratio 0.188 -0.026 -0.027 -0.025 -0.022 -0.040 0.014 * 
leverage 0.531 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.009 0.015 -0.006 ***
advertising (*100) 0.010 -0.043 -0.020 0.028 -0.034 -0.032 -0.011  
div_yield 0.016 -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.005  
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it doesn’t mean the influence of relationship institutions is lower. We need to consider that the 
average number of relationship institutions is about 2.4 and that number of independent 
institutions is about 150.2 for firms with positive SUE (see Table 2.8). If we divide the 
coefficients by the average number of relationship and independent institution respectively, the 
marginal effect of per relationship institution is much higher than that of independent institution5. 
 Panel B of Table 2.10 reports the regression result for firms with negative earnings surprises. 
We should remember a smaller PS measure (more negative value) when firms with negative SUE 
indicates more buying from relationship institutions. Also, lower Amihud’s price impact measure, 
LM3 measure and Hasbrouck’s trading cost mean improvement of stock liquidity. Therefore, the 
positive and significant coefficients of rela_ps in all three models show that the stock liquidity 
improves when firms receive more support from relationship institutions. Similarly, firms with 
more buying from independent institutions also have smaller price impact and lower trading cost.  
 For firms with negative SUE, the average number of relationship institutions is about 2.7 
and that number of independent institutions is 137.8 institutions for firms with positive SUE (see 
Table 2.9). Therefore, the marginal effect of per relationship institution is much higher than that 
of independent institution6. If we compare the coefficient of rela_ps in Model 1 between Panel A 
and Panel B, we can find the marginal effect is higher when firms with negative earnings 
surprise. For example, compared to marginal effect in Panel A (0.0208), one additional unit PS 
reduces the Amihud’s price impact by 0.0508 in Panel B.  
 To sum up, we find two interesting conclusion. First, both buying of relationship institution 
and independent institution improve the stock liquidity. The marginal effect per relationship 
institution is much higher than the effect per independent institution. Second, the trading impact 
                                                 
5 0.0208/2.4=0.0087 vs. 0.0729/150.2=0.00048  
6 0.0508/2.7=0.0188 vs. 0.0944/137.8=0.000685 for Amihud’s price impact 
  0.0000889/2.7=0.000033 vs. 0.000162/137.8=0.0000012 for Hasbrouck’s trading cost 
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of relationship institution is higher when their client firms have negative earnings surprise than 
positive surprise. These findings are consistent with the relationship insurance hypothesis. 
2.4.5 Price Support and Preceding Firm Characteristics 
 In this section, we try to examine what types of firms will attract more buying from 
relationship institutions and independent institutions around earnings announcements. In the 
previous sections, we find some evidences supporting relationship insurance hypothesis. If 
relationship institutions really support their client firms to maintain the future business 
opportunity, we should expect that relationship institutions support their client firms more 
aggressively when their clients suffer from liquidity problems. 
 We run the Fama-Macbeth regression of PS measures on preceding firm characteristics and 
report the result in Table 2.11. Panel A provides the finding for firms with positive SUE. We 
only find a positive relation between relationship PS measure and Amihud’s price impact in 
Model 1. Hence, relationship institutions tend to buy firms with higher price impact. The 
independent institution exhibits similar result in Panel B. Furthermore, both institutions tend to 
buy firms with higher SUE and better stock performance since they don’t need to support firms 
with positive earnings surprises.  
 We are particularly interested in firms with negative earnings surprises since firms should 
need more support with bad earnings. Panel C reports the regression result for relationship PS 
measure on firms with negative SUE. The negative and significant coefficients on illd (-0.0186) 
and lm3 (-0.0201) suggest that firms with higher price impact or more non-trading days tend to 
receive more buying from the relationship institutions. This is more consistent with relationship 
insurance hypothesis. Since negative earnings surprises usually induce selling pressures for 
stocks, relationship institutions will support their client firms when they face selling pressures 
and need more liquidity.  
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Table 2.10 Regression of Liquidity Changes on PS measures 
This table provides the regression of different liquidity measures on price support measures and other 
firm characteristics. It examines the effect of the institutions’ trading on stock liquidity around earnings 
announcements. The dependent variables are Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, Liu’s (2006) LM3 
measure and Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective trading cost measure. Panel A reports the subsamples with 
positive SUE and Panel B reports those with negative SUE. The main explanatory variables are 
relationship PS measure (rela_ps) and independent PS measure (nonrela_ps) described in Table 2.8. The 
definitions of other controlling variables are as followings: age is the logarithm of the year that the firm 
has record in the CRSP database; sue is the standardized unexpected earnings; err is actual earnings per 
share minus the consensus of analysts’ forecast and is deflated by the stock price at the end of each 
quarter prior to the earnings announcement; numest is the number of analyst followings before the 
announcement; stdev is the standard deviation of analysts’ earnings forecast; 3m_return is the 
accumulated stock return; var_return is the variance of return in previous quarter; eps is the exact earnings 
per share, recorded by I/B/E/S; capital_exp is the ratio of capital expenditures to lagged assets; roa is 
income before extraordinary items divided by the lagged assets; herfin is the Herfindahl index; bm is the 
book value divided by the market value; lnmkt_value is logarithm of firm’s market value; cashratio is the 
ratio of total cash to lagged assets; leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity plus 
the book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; advertising is advertising expense divided 
by total asset; div_yield is the yearly dividend yield. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the symbols: *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Panel A: positive SUE  
Model  (1) (2) (3)
 Amihud’s ratio Liu’s lm3 Hasbrouck’s trading cost
rela ps -0.0208*** 0.00231 0.00000195 
 (-4.56) (0.52) (0.07) 
nonrela ps -0.0729*** 0.0100 -0.0000497*** 
 (-10.40) (1.32) (-2.70) 
age 0.00145 0.0145 -0.0000630* 
 (0.17) (1.34) (-1.93) 
sue -0.0113*** -0.00870*** -0.000000208 
 (-3.23) (-2.98) (-0.02) 
err -1.777*** -1.373 0.00496 
 (-3.35) (-1.58) (1.63) 
numest -0.00263** 0.000234 0.00000522 
 (-2.31) (0.19) (1.47) 
stdev 0.635*** 0.0348 0.00223*** 
 (4.67) (0.37) (4.36) 
3m return -0.439*** -0.0519 0.000407** 
 (-10.99) (-1.28) (2.59) 
var return -51.20*** 7.185 -0.419*** 
 (-2.79) (0.35) (-4.72) 
eps 0.0290 0.0104 0.0000476 
 (1.56) (0.94) (0.84) 
capital exp 0.255 -0.919** -0.000110 
 (0.91) (-2.13) (-0.08) 
roa -0.519* -0.602*** -0.000723 
 (-1.75) (-2.94) (-0.63) 
herfin -0.0000257 0.0000246 0.000000333*** 
 (-1.34) (0.75) (3.89) 
bm -0.135*** 0.0130 -0.000256** 
 (-6.35) (0.57) (-2.40) 
lnmkt value 0.0734*** 0.0295* 0.0000424 
 (6.45) (1.73) (1.46) 
cashratio 0.0495 0.0619* 0.000217* 
 (1.40) (1.83) (1.85) 
leverage -0.204*** -0.103** 0.00000980 
 (-4.46) (-2.33) (0.06) 
advertising 0.151 0.0765 -0.0000984 
 (0.85) (0.57) (-0.21) 
div yield 1.090** -1.640*** -0.00278 
 (2.22) (-3.09) (-1.22) 
R2 0.1696 0.0480 0.1082 
N 33878 33861 29821 
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(table 2.10 continued) 
Panel B: Negative SUE    
Model  (1) (2) (3)
 Amihud’s ratio Liu’s lm3 Hasbrouck’s trading cost
rela ps 0.0508*** 0.0156*** 0.0000889*** 
 (6.41) (3.55) (2.85) 
nonrela ps 0.0944*** -0.00990 0.000162*** 
 (10.60) (-1.32) (3.77) 
age -0.0238** -0.00355 -0.0000534 
 (-2.42) (-0.26) (-1.09) 
sue 0.00343 -0.00915* -0.0000308 
 (0.64) (-1.76) (-1.19) 
err -4.001*** -0.937 -0.00542 
 (-3.23) (-0.93) (-0.78) 
numest 0.00576*** 0.00372** -0.00000127 
 (3.08) (2.07) (-0.14) 
stdev 0.919*** 0.194 0.00426*** 
 (5.60) (1.16) (3.11) 
3m return -0.656*** -0.0505 0.000821*** 
 (-13.40) (-0.91) (2.83) 
var return 68.92*** 15.65 -0.307*** 
 (3.93) (0.86) (-2.77) 
eps 0.0775*** 0.0106 0.000587*** 
 (3.72) (0.58) (3.79) 
capital exp 0.807** -0.795** 0.00305* 
 (2.19) (-2.01) (1.86) 
roa 0.682 0.671* 0.00219 
 (1.64) (1.84) (1.51) 
herfin -0.000142*** -0.0000683** -0.000000442*** 
 (-3.86) (-2.25) (-2.93) 
bm -0.132*** 0.0431 -0.000375*** 
 (-4.60) (1.40) (-2.71) 
lnmkt value -0.0674*** -0.0371* -0.000114** 
 (-5.23) (-1.78) (-2.57) 
cashratio -0.0368 -0.0284 0.000416 
 (-0.82) (-0.74) (1.47) 
leverage -0.0431 -0.0734* 0.000326 
 (-0.68) (-1.86) (1.34) 
advertising -0.307 -0.154 0.000662 
 (-1.37) (-0.54) (0.64) 
div yield -4.369*** -0.646 -0.0104*** 
 (-7.38) (-0.98) (-3.55) 
R2 0.2273 0.0829 0.1239 
N 16488 16473 14892 
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 Table 2.11 Price Support and Preceding Firm Characteristics 
Panel A: Positive SUE and dependent variable is relationship PS    
Model (1) (2) (3) 
illd 0.0121**  
 (2.03)  
lm3 -0.00218  
 (-0.38)  
hasbrouck 0.486 
 (0.29) 
age 0.0172** 0.0173** 0.0180** 
 (2.17) (2.16) (2.21) 
sue 0.0191*** 0.0193*** 0.0193*** 
 (3.35) (3.37) (3.28) 
err -0.620 -0.620 -0.585 
 (-1.36) (-1.36) (-1.31) 
numest 0.00161 0.00130 0.00107 
 (1.30) (1.12) (0.93) 
stdev -0.243** -0.250** -0.247** 
 (-2.10) (-2.15) (-2.11) 
3m return 0.0806*** 0.0693** 0.0721** 
 (2.71) (2.37) (2.36) 
var return 14.27* 13.75 12.49 
 (1.72) (1.60) (1.23) 
eps 0.0123 0.0128 0.0119 
 (0.74) (0.77) (0.73) 
capital exp 0.193 0.174 0.293 
 (0.86) (0.78) (1.28) 
roa -0.377* -0.383* -0.321 
 (-1.93) (-1.98) (-1.53) 
herfin -0.0000321* -0.0000330* -0.0000223
 (-1.81) (-1.81) (-1.23) 
bm -0.0195 -0.0168 -0.0190 
 (-1.30) (-1.14) (-1.37) 
lnmkt value 0.0290*** 0.0146** 0.0145** 
 (3.18) (2.45) (2.38) 
cashratio -0.0906*** -0.0956*** -0.0972***
 (-3.48) (-3.73) (-4.08) 
leverage 0.0367 0.0370 0.0466 
 (1.39) (1.41) (1.60) 
advertising 0.218 0.223 0.239 
 (1.41) (1.43) (1.60) 
div yield -0.737* -0.686* -0.542 
 (-1.85) (-1.73) (-1.27) 
R2 0.0505 0.0496 0.0512 
N 33902 33892 32468 
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(table 2.11 continued) 
Panel B: Positive SUE and dependent variable is independent PS    
Model (1) (2) (3) 
illd 0.0434***  
 (6.71)  
lm3 -0.00911  
 (-1.02)  
hasbrouck -1.680 
 (-0.86) 
age -0.0207** -0.0218** -0.0230** 
 (-2.11) (-2.24) (-2.33) 
sue 0.0184** 0.0187** 0.0174** 
 (2.41) (2.48) (2.34) 
err 0.354 0.313 0.310 
 (0.71) (0.65) (0.60) 
numest -0.00175 -0.00285* -0.00299* 
 (-1.16) (-1.94) (-1.95) 
stdev -0.0333 -0.0785 -0.0515 
 (-0.32) (-0.75) (-0.48) 
3m return 0.0698** 0.0285 0.0172 
 (2.05) (0.84) (0.51) 
var return -16.81 -20.33* -12.77 
 (-1.61) (-2.00) (-1.08) 
eps 0.00835 0.00434 0.00468 
 (0.59) (0.30) (0.33) 
capital exp -1.909*** -1.950*** -1.803*** 
 (-4.52) (-4.65) (-4.36) 
roa 0.237 0.241 0.167 
 (1.35) (1.39) (0.90) 
herfin -0.000121*** -0.000120*** -0.000132***
 (-5.01) (-4.84) (-5.21) 
bm 0.00363 0.0102 0.0124 
 (0.23) (0.66) (0.82) 
lnmkt value 0.00597 -0.0473*** -0.0432*** 
 (0.57) (-6.20) (-5.54) 
cashratio -0.0816*** -0.105*** -0.119*** 
 (-2.97) (-3.71) (-3.96) 
leverage 0.0417 0.0425 0.0356 
 (1.21) (1.24) (1.06) 
advertising 0.350** 0.347** 0.306** 
 (2.49) (2.43) (2.08) 
div yield -0.967* -0.722 -0.871* 
 (-1.93) (-1.42) (-1.69) 
R2 0.0677 0.0669 0.0672 
N 33902 33892 32468 
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(table 2.11 continued) 
Panel C: Negative SUE and dependent variable is relationship PS    
Model (1) (2) (3) 
illd -0.0186**  
 (-2.25)  
lm3 -0.0201**  
 (-2.03)  
hasbrouck 0.631 
 (0.22) 
age -0.0108 -0.00861 -0.0101 
 (-0.73) (-0.58) (-0.66) 
sue 0.00541 0.00619 0.00674 
 (0.68) (0.78) (0.82) 
err 0.195 0.143 0.186 
 (0.19) (0.14) (0.18) 
numest 0.00303 0.00385 0.00382 
 (1.09) (1.43) (1.41) 
stdev -0.219 -0.195 -0.235 
 (-1.20) (-1.07) (-1.22) 
3m return -0.130*** -0.118*** -0.109** 
 (-3.03) (-2.73) (-2.43) 
var return 26.31*** 27.09*** 28.98*** 
 (2.82) (2.84) (2.90) 
eps -0.00225 -0.00126 0.00719 
 (-0.10) (-0.06) (0.32) 
capital exp -0.660 -0.636 -0.644 
 (-1.67) (-1.59) (-1.61) 
roa 0.362 0.353 0.358 
 (1.31) (1.28) (1.31) 
herfin -0.0000153 -0.0000162 -0.0000168 
 (-0.44) (-0.47) (-0.49) 
bm -0.00979 -0.0106 -0.00778 
 (-0.42) (-0.46) (-0.33) 
lnmkt value -0.0609*** -0.0405*** -0.0419*** 
 (-4.38) (-4.15) (-4.03) 
cashratio -0.0253 -0.00716 -0.00798 
 (-0.66) (-0.19) (-0.22) 
leverage 0.00293 0.000241 0.00799 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.19) 
advertising -0.0748 -0.0453 -0.0517 
 (-0.30) (-0.19) (-0.21) 
div yield -0.431 -0.540 -0.573 
 (-0.78) (-0.99) (-0.99) 
R2 0.0807 0.0796 0.0838 
N 16531 16528 16257 
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(table 2.11 continued) 
Panel D: Negative SUE and dependent variable is independent PS    
Model (1) (2) (3) 
illd -0.0108  
 (-0.76)  
lm3 0.00962  
 (0.45)  
hasbrouck 12.53*** 
 (3.89) 
age -0.0279** -0.0283** -0.0271** 
 (-2.14) (-2.16) (-2.07) 
sue 0.00594 0.00640 0.00705 
 (0.72) (0.79) (0.84) 
err -1.006 -1.169 -0.886 
 (-0.99) (-1.12) (-0.89) 
numest -0.0000413 0.000859 0.0000610 
 (-0.01) (0.29) (0.02) 
stdev -0.00922 0.00205 -0.0121 
 (-0.05) (0.01) (-0.06) 
3m return -0.0879 -0.0836 -0.0634 
 (-1.56) (-1.41) (-1.09) 
var return 12.03 17.18 12.23 
 (0.92) (1.23) (0.74) 
eps 0.0347 0.0346 0.0421* 
 (1.46) (1.40) (1.77) 
capital exp -1.254*** -1.219*** -1.120** 
 (-2.88) (-2.73) (-2.39) 
roa -0.512 -0.506 -0.446 
 (-1.21) (-1.20) (-1.10) 
herfin 0.0000944*** 0.0000941*** 0.0000896***
 (3.45) (3.28) (3.20) 
bm 0.0751** 0.0813** 0.0796** 
 (2.43) (2.64) (2.56) 
lnmkt value -0.0491** -0.0381*** -0.0261** 
 (-2.61) (-2.94) (-2.02) 
cashratio 0.0291 0.0371 0.0408 
 (0.80) (1.02) (1.11) 
leverage 0.149** 0.157** 0.150** 
 (2.37) (2.44) (2.36) 
advertising 0.765*** 0.793*** 0.752*** 
 (3.31) (3.34) (3.21) 
div yield -0.693 -0.680 -0.627 
 (-0.88) (-0.89) (-0.83) 
R2 0.0981 0.0953 0.0996 
N 16531 16528 16257 
This table provides the regression of price support measures (PS) on preceding firm characteristics. Panel A and B show the results for positive 
SUE. Panel C and D show results for negative SUE. The definitions of all variables are the same as those in Table 2.10. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis and the symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Panel D of Table 2.11 shows a different story for the independent institutions. The positive 
and significant coefficient on hasbrouck (12.53) indicates that independent institutions tend to 
choose firms with lower trading cost when these firms have negative earnings shocks. To sum up, 
the trading incentives for relationship and independent institutions are different. 
We also use the Logit Model to examine what types of firms are more likely to become 
connected firms and by their relationship institutions. The dependent variable is 1 if firms are 
connected firms and 0 otherwise. We estimate the model with stock liquidity and firm 
characteristics. In Table 2.12, the coefficients on illd (-0.391), lm3 (-0.274) and hasbrouck 
(-34.64) indicate that relationship institutions hold firms with better liquidity.  
 This finding doesn’t contradict with the previous finding (Table 2.11) that illiquid client 
firms receive more support from relationship institutions. They are two different concepts. 
Before institutional investors choose which firms to begin underwriting/ lending business and 
become their shareholders, they will prefer more liquid firms due to risk averse. After the 
institutions build up the relationship and those firms become connected firms, financial 
institutions will want to keep good relationship with their existing clients and support them when 
they need liquidity. The coefficients in Table 2.11 are all consistent with our forecasts. 
 From the Logit model, smaller firm age increases the likelihood of being a connected firm. 
This can be explained by the need of cash for younger firms in the early stage. It is obvious that 
institutions tend to have more underwriting/lending business with younger firms. Similarly, 
institutions tend to have underwriting/lending service and hold firms with higher capital 
expenditure ratios, lower cash ratio, higher leverage ratio and lower dividend yield. These firms 
should raise capital more often and need the service from the institutions. 
In the Logit model, the coefficients only reveal the direction of association between the 
dependent variable and explanatory variables. To evaluate the economic relevance, we need to 
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Table 2.12 Determinants of the Connected Firms 
Model (1) (2) (3) 
illd -0.391***  
 (-29.29)  
lm3 -0.274***  
 (-13.15)  
hasbrouck -34.64***
 (-11.76) 
age -0.174*** -0.167*** -0.164***
 (-10.57) (-10.24) (-9.96) 
err 0.0427 0.0274 0.00331 
 (0.33) (0.21) (0.03) 
numest -0.0277*** -0.0126*** -0.0120***
 (-9.71) (-4.49) (-4.18) 
stdev -0.0775 0.0362 0.0642 
 (-0.81) (0.38) (0.67) 
3m_return -0.0396 0.238*** 0.202*** 
 (-0.95) (5.91) (4.91) 
var_return 217.6*** 237.9*** 265.6*** 
 (19.52) (21.33) (22.91) 
eps -0.0106 0.0198 -0.00305 
 (-0.49) (0.92) (-0.14) 
capital_exp 3.388*** 3.696*** 3.546*** 
 (6.96) (7.57) (7.21) 
lnmkt_value 0.193*** 0.634*** 0.619*** 
 (9.59) (49.69) (46.51) 
herfin 0.000127*** 0.000173*** 0.0000974**
 (2.86) (3.56) (2.10) 
bm 0.490*** 0.456*** 0.455*** 
 (16.30) (15.31) (15.20) 
cashratio -0.277*** -0.144*** -0.120***
 (-7.39) (-3.96) (-3.24) 
leverage 2.336*** 2.253*** 2.243*** 
 (38.26) (37.28) (36.64) 
div_yield -8.393*** -10.99*** -11.21***
 (-10.51) (-13.80) (-13.96) 
N 48836 48825 47333 
Pseudo R2 0.1579 0.1489 0.1448 
This table reports Logit model’s estimation of the determinants of probability that a firm will be held by its 
relationship institution and become the connected firm. The definitions of all independent variables are the same as 
those in Table 2.10. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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check Table 2.13 which provides the marginal effect for every explanatory variable. We are 
interested in the stock liquidity. On average, one unit increase in the firm’s Amihud’s price 
impact reduces the likelihood of being selected as the connected firm by 8.79% unit and one 
additional unit in LM3 reduces the likelihood by 6.19% unit. 
2.4.6 Robustness Check: Sample Selection 
 The comparison between connected and unconnected firms above may suffer from sample 
selection problem. It is possible that the observed price support effect is driven not by the trading 
of relationship institutions but by different firm characteristics between connected and 
unconnected firms. To address this concern, we examine the effect of price support within 
connected firms and focus on negative earnings surprises. 
Panel A of Table 2.14 reports the PS measure when connected firms are sorted into quintiles 
with their past four quarter’s average SUE. Panel A shows that, when the average SUE is at the 
bottom quintile (lowest SUE), both relationship and independent institutions buys connected 
firms. However, there are more buying from relationship institutions than from independent 
institutions since the absolute value of relationship PS is higher. Relationship institutions provide 
more supportive activities than independent institutions, which is consistent with the relationship 
insurance hypothesis.  
Panel B of Table 2.14 compares the trading behaviors of independent institutions on 
connected firms and unconnected firms. Compared to connected firms, unconnected firms 
receive more significant selling pressures from the independent institutions when they have 
negative earnings shocks. 
2.4.7 Abnormal Stock Performance  
To measure the stock return’s impact of the trading behaviors from relationship institutions, 
we estimate cumulative monthly abnormal stock returns by applying event study technique. We 
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Table 2.13 Marginal Effect 
Model (1)   (2)   (3)   
 marginal Z-value  marginal Z-value  marginal Z-value  
illd -0.0879 -29.1 ***       
lm3    -0.0619 -13 ***    
hasbrouck       -7.7660 -11.7 *** 
age -0.0391 -10.6 *** -0.0377 -10.3 *** -0.0369 -9.97 *** 
err 0.0096 0.33  0.0062 0.21  0.0007 0.03  
numest -0.0062 -9.7 *** -0.0029 -4.49 *** -0.0027 -4.18 *** 
stdev -0.0174 -0.81  0.0082 0.38  0.0144 0.67  
3m_return -0.0089 -0.95  0.0537 5.91 *** 0.0453 4.91 *** 
var_return 48.9394 19.6 *** 53.6580 21.4 *** 59.5463 23 *** 
eps -0.0024 -0.49  0.0045 0.92  -0.0007 -0.14  
capital_exp 0.7620 6.96 *** 0.8335 7.57 *** 0.7949 7.21 *** 
lnmkt_value 0.0435 9.62 *** 0.1430 50.7 *** 0.1387 47.3 *** 
herfin 0.00003 2.86 *** 0.00004 3.56 *** 0.00002 2.1 ** 
bm 0.1103 16.3 *** 0.1027 15.3 *** 0.1020 15.2 *** 
cashratio -0.0623 -7.38 *** -0.0325 -3.96 *** -0.0269 -3.24 *** 
leverage 0.5254 38.4 *** 0.5082 37.4 *** 0.5029 36.8 *** 
div_yield -1.8878 -10.5 *** -2.4793 -13.8 *** -2.5124 -14 *** 
This table presents the marginal changes in the probability that the shares of a firm will be held by its relationship 
institutions. Estimations are from the Logit Model of Tables 2.12. The definitions of the variables are the same as 
those in Table 2.10. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 2.14 Price Support within Connected Firms 
This table reports the price supporting behavior of institutions. Each quarter, companies are sorted into quintiles with 
their past four quarter’s average SUE. Rela_PS measures the price supporting from relationship institutions and 
Nonrela_PS measures that from independent institutions. A smaller PS measure (more negative value) when SUE is 
negative indicates more buying from institutions. Panel A compares the price support from relational institutions and 
independent institutions within connected firms. Panel B compares the trading behaviors of independent institutions 
between connected and unconnected firms. T-statistics are in parenthesis. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: support for connected firms from relationship and independent institutions 
Rank of average 4 quarter’s SUE 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 
Connected firm Rela_PS -0.193  -0.101  -0.002  0.224  0.450  
Connected firm Nonrela_PS -0.091  -0.069  0.024  0.161  0.162  
 Difference -0.102** -0.032  -0.026  0.064**  0.288*** 
  (-2.21) (-1.08)  (-1.37)  (2.00)  (4.59)  
Panel B: support for connected firms and unconnected firms from independent institutions 
Rank of average 4 quarter’s SUE  1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) 
Connected firm Nonrela_PS -0.091  -0.069  0.024  0.161  0.162  
Unconnected firm Nonrela_PS 0.049  -0.036  0.067  0.192  0.262  
 Difference -0.139*** -0.033  -0.043**  -0.031  -0.100*  
  (-3.41)  (-1.33)  (-2.14)  (-1.11)  (-1.94) 
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conduct Fama and French 3-factor model with momentum using CSRP value-weighted index. 
Different returns windows are reported in Table 2.15. For window (+1, +6) in Panel A, quintile 5 
firms receiving more buying from relationship institutions have smaller abnormal returns than 
quintile 1 firms (1.08% vs. 4%) in the six month period. This is consistent with the previous 
results that connected firms receiving more support from relationship institutions experience less 
price declines than quintile 1 firms. The patterns are even more dramatic in window (-3, +6). 
To illustrate the price impact between firms with and without support, we compute a pseudo 
price around earnings announcement. Suppose the market is efficient and the stock price in 
month 6 after the earnings announcement represents the true value of the company. If we assume 
the stock price in month 6 is $100, we can use the abnormal return to infer the pseudo stock 
price7 in month 1. Table 2.15 shows the pseudo price around earnings announcement (month 1) 
and one quarter earlier (month -3). Comparing the prices between quintile 1 and quintile 5, we 
can infer the price impact of institutional trading. The price impact of window (+1, +6) and (-3, 
+6) are $2.78 (=98.93-96.15) and $4.41 (=97.48-93.34) respectively. Similar price impacts are 
found in Panel B when the firms are sorted based on the buying of independent institutions. The 
corresponding price impacts are $2.79 and $2.54. The difference between $4.41 and $2.54 is 
economically substantial. It indicates that the buying of relationship institutions provides 
stronger price impact when firms experiencing negative earnings surprises. Furthermore, this 
support of relationship institutions is not explained by information since those supported firms 
have worse stock returns. This finding is consistent with the relationship insurance hypothesis.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Financial conglomerates have more information advantage after they are allowed to combine 
different business lines. When financial institutions hold their client firms’ stocks, they 
                                                 
7 The following equation for the pseudo price (P0) of quintile 1 in month 1 should hold: (100-P0)/P0=1.08%. 
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Table 2.15 Price Support Measure and Stock Abnormal Return 
Panel A: Sorting by rela_PS 
rank 5(Strong) 4 3 2 1 (Weak) S-W 
Rela_ps -1.617  -0.848  -0.179  0.525  1.424   
Nonrela_ps -0.045  -0.088  -0.099  -0.130  -0.175   
[0, 0] 1.10% 0.37% 0.14% 1.03% 1.44% -0.34% 
[+1, +3] 0.63% 0.42% 1.33% 1.78% 1.68% -1.05% 
[+4, +6] 0.46% 0.24% 0.23% 1.01% 2.35% -1.89%** 
[+1, +6] 1.08% 0.66% 1.56% 2.78% 4.00% -2.92%*** 
[-3, +6] 2.59% 1.41% 2.17% 4.67% 7.14% -4.55%*** 
Pseudo price (month +1) 98.93 99.34 98.46 97.30 96.15  
Price impact (relative to rank 1) 2.78      
Pseudo price (month -3)  97.48 98.61 97.88 95.54 93.34  
Price impact (relative to rank 1) 4.41      
Panel B: Sorting by nonrela_PS 
Rank 5(Strong) 4 3 2 1 (Weak) S-W 
Nonrela_PS -1.418  -0.681  -0.128  0.429  1.260   
Rela_PS -0.040  -0.092  -0.167  -0.195  -0.199   
[0, 0] 0.19% 0.62% 0.63% 0.98% 1.65% -1.46%*** 
[+1, +3] 1.32% 0.71% 0.20% 0.96% 2.67% -1.35%* 
[+4, +6] 0.46% 0.80% 0.49% 0.44% 2.12% -1.66%** 
[+1, +6] 1.77% 1.50% 0.69% 1.39% 4.74% -2.97%*** 
[-3, +6] 3.85% 3.29% 1.30% 2.88% 6.67% -2.82%* 
Pseudo price (month +1) 98.26 98.52 99.31 98.63 95.47  
Price impact (relative to rank 1) 2.79      
Pseudo price (month -3)  96.29 96.81 98.72 97.20 93.75  
Price impact (relative to rank 1) 2.54      
This table reports the relationship between the PS measures and stock’s cumulative abnormal return estimated from the Fama and 
French 3-factor model with momentum factor. The sample only includes connected firms whose previous 4 quarter’s SUEs are 
negative. Firms are sorted into quintile based on the price support measure from relationship institutions (Panel A) and 
independent institutions (Panel B) over the previous 4 quarters. Month 0 is the month when earnings are announced and the 
corresponding windows are denoted in the brackets. Pseudo prices in month -3 and month 1 are computed by assuming the 
stock’s price of month 6 is $100. The price impact measures the difference of pseudo stock price (in month +1 or -3) between 
quintile 5 and 1. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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may exploit the private information obtained from their affiliated banks to make profit or support 
their clients to maintain good relationships for future business opportunity. This paper studies 
this issue by examining the impact of institutions’ trading activities on their client firms around 
earnings announcements periods. 
The empirical findings support the relationship insurance hypothesis, rather than the 
information advantage hypothesis. Relationship institutions, on average, support their client 
firms when these firms have negative earnings surprises. Such activities also discourage selling 
pressures from independent institutions. Furthermore, price support from relationship institutions 
can mitigate downward swing of their client firms’ stock prices and the 
post-earnings-announcement-drifts are less pronounced. Finally, the price support from 
relationship institutions is more effective than that of independent institutions and relationship 
institutions tend to support their client firms when they need liquidity. 
This study contributes to literature on financial institutions by studying the 
non-intermediary role of financial conglomerates in the capital markets. The findings can provide 
general implications for asset pricing literature. Inactive institutional relationship can be 
considered a risk factor because supportive institutional relationship can smooth out temporary 
negative shocks while firms without such relationship would have incurred the price swing. 
Moreover, financial institutions can also mitigate the noise in the market and enhance the stock 
prices of their clients. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE EFFECT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTION’S DUAL 
HOLDINGS OF DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES ON STOCK 
LIQUIDITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 Institutional investors play an important role and have a great impact on the U.S. equity 
market. According to Agarwal (2007), institutional investors held almost 65% of shares for firms 
listed in NYSE and AMEX in 2005 and their holdings grow at a 6.3% annual rate over the past 
25 years. Although institutional investors help to improve corporate governance and enhance 
shareholders’ benefit, they also bring some costs to the market. For example, large institutional 
investors, especially those financial conglomerates with investment banking and commercial 
banking divisions, have advantages in accessing and processing information of their client firms. 
Since these institutions own more private information, their counterparty market makers will ask 
for a wider bid-ask spread when they trade with these institutions. Hence, this higher adverse 
selection cost can reduce the liquidity of the stocks held by big institutional investors. 
 On the contrary, informed institutions can improve stock liquidity. When stocks are held by 
different informed institutions, stock prices should reflect information more quickly due to the 
competition among these informed institutions. Furthermore, increases in institutional ownership 
can also induce more subsequent analyst followings and create a better information environment. 
Thus, the financial analysts can provide more correct earnings forecast and prompt 
recommendation. Investors will be more willing to trade these stocks and improve the stock 
liquidity because of better information environment. 
 Stock liquidity is an important issue in the financial market and academic research. The 
effect of informed traders on stock liquidity and price efficiency has attracted many studies in the 
literature. Although many studies have examined the empirical relationship between total 
institutional holdings and stock’s liquidity, the findings are mixed. Previous researchers usually 
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use small datasets or narrow time period to examine the effect of institutional investors on 
liquidity. The disadvantage of using shorter time frame is the difficulty to control for unobserved 
firm-specific effects that simultaneously influences institutional ownership and liquidity and the 
endogenous problems between them (Agarwal, 2007). In this paper, we use quarterly data from 
1990 to 2004 with panel data regressions to examine the relation between the liquidity and 
institutional holdings. The panel data spanning 60 quarters helps to examine not only the 
variation of liquidity among firms, but also the relations between institutional holdings and 
liquidity at firm level over time. 
 Previous research only examines the relationship between total institutional holdings and 
stock’s liquidity. To extend the study, we focus on the impact of relationship institutions on stock 
liquidity. Specifically, we study the impact on stock liquidity when firms are held by their 
relational institutions whose affiliated groups have lending or underwriting business with these 
firms. Compared to independent institutions, relationship institutions can obtain more private 
information of their clients from the lending/underwriting business. For example, in addition to 
screening during loan applications, banks can monitor the firms by sitting on the boards and 
gather more information (Santos and Rumble, 2006). Therefore, these relationship institutions 
are more likely to obtain private information about their client firms from the affiliated banks. 
When they trade the stock of their client firms, the counterparty market maker will request a 
higher bid-ask spread since these firms have higher probability of informed trading.   
 On the other hand, when relationship institutions are willing to hold shares of their client 
firms, they should have confidence in the prospect of these companies. This will provide a 
certification effect which signals the quality of these client firms and enhances investors’ 
incentives to buy these stocks. Liquidity has many dimensions and it is not easy to use a single 
measure to capture all of its aspects. Previous studies focus on the bid-ask spread and quote 
 60
depth. In this chapter, we use three liquidity measures: Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective trading cost, 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, and Liu’s (2006) illiquidity measure (LM3) to conduct the 
empirical study. In general, illiquid firms should benefit more from the certification effect of 
relational institutional investors. 
 The evidence in this chapter shows that consistent with information improvement 
hypothesis, firms with higher aggregated institutional holdings exhibit better liquidity. However, 
due to the adverse selection problem, firms with higher holdings of relationship investors will 
end up with lower liquidity. Specifically, these firms have higher trading cost, more non-trading 
days and larger price impact.   
 The rest of the chapter is organized as followings. Section 3.2 presents relevant literature 
and develops the hypothesis. Section 3.3 describes the sources of data. Section 3.4 discusses the 
empirical evidence and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1 Literature Review 
 The trading of institutional investors has direct and indirect impacts on the information 
environment and stock liquidity. For example, institutions are more “informed” and 
“sophisticated” than individual investors and their trading may convey superb information. They 
are likely to sell stocks when they know some bad news and buy stocks when they have good 
news in advance. This creates an adverse selection problem. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
propose a model to explain the effect of the presence of traders with superior information on the 
bid-ask spread. In their model, the competitive market makers will lose profit from trading with 
informed traders and make gains from trading with uninformed traders. Because market makers 
should have zero profit in a competitive market, this implies that the gains of the informed trader 
are at the expense of the uninformed trade. Market makers will charge a bigger spread when they 
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are more likely to trade with informed traders. From this point of view, market makers will 
request higher spreads when they trade firms with higher institutional holdings to compensate for 
the higher probability of trading with informed traders. As a result, this will reduce the stock 
liquidity. Easley and O’ Hara (1987) also claim that in the presence of informed investors, the 
risk-neutral market maker will request a higher bid-ask spread due to the adverse selection risk.  
 However, informed institutions can play another role on stock liquidity. When stocks are 
held by multiple informed institutions, stock prices should reflect information more quickly due 
to the competition among these informed institutions. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) also 
claim that increases in institutional ownership may induce subsequent increase in the number of 
analyst following and change the information environment. They document that the increase on 
institution holding may narrow stock spread indirectly since the increase in analyst following can 
reduce the information asymmetry. Because stock prices are more informational efficient now, 
investors will have more confident that the stock transactions are at a “fair price” and increase 
their interests to trade these stocks, thus improving stock liquidity. Previous research focuses on 
the relationship between total institutional holdings and stock’s liquidity. For instances, Sarin, 
Shastri and Shastri (2000) document that higher institutional holding is associated with wider 
spreads and smaller quoted depth. Using a sample of 786 Amex and NYSE listed firms, they find 
that both higher institutional and insider ownership are positively related to wider spreads and 
smaller quoted depth. However, the reason is different. They claim that the loss of liquidity for 
higher insider trading is caused by higher adverse selection costs while the decrease in liquidity 
for higher institutions results from a higher inventory carrying costs. 
 In contrast, Tinic (1972) and Hamilton (1978) show a negative relationship between 
institutional holdings and bid-ask spread for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks respectively. Jenning, 
Schnatterly and Seguin (2002) empirically examine whether changes in institutional holding 
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adversely affect the quoted bid-ask spread of NASDAQ securities. Surprisingly, they find that 
the stock’s spread is negatively associated with levels of institutional ownership and confirm that 
changes in institutional holding Granger-cause changes in spreads. They also show that the 
proportion of adverse selection in spread decreases when the institutional ownership increases. 
Rubin (2007) finds that liquidity is positively related to total institutional holdings but negatively 
related to institutional block holdings. He claims that the higher level of institutional ownership 
proxies for more trading activity which improves the stock liquidity while more concentration of 
ownership implies a higher adverse selection problem which reduces the liquidity. 
 There are other empirical studies which haven’t found find any relationship between the 
spread and institutional holdings. For example, Fabozzi (1979) examines 239 OTC firms and 
finds no evidence of the relationship between spread and institutional holdings. Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988) also fail to find any statistical relationship between spread and institutional 
ownership for 56 NYSE securities. Recently, Agarwal (2007) finds a U-shape relationship 
between the fraction of shares of a company held by institutional investors and its stock liquidity.  
3.2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 Previous literature shows that the relationship between the institutional ownership and stock 
liquidity is still a puzzle and need to be solved. We can summarize the existing findings into the 
following hypotheses. 
H1a: All else are equal, firms with higher institutional holdings will have lower liquidity.  
 (Adverse selection hypothesis) 
H1b: All else are equal, firms with higher institutional holdings will have better liquidity. 
(Information improvement hypothesis) 
 The total impact of institutional holdings on stock liquidity depends on the net effect of 
adverse selection and information improvement. We use panel data spanning 60 quarters to 
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examine the net effect. This method considers not only the variation of liquidity among firms, 
but also the relations between institutional holdings and liquidity at firm level over time. 
 In additional to overall institutional holdings, we also examine the effect when firms are 
held by their relationship institutions whose affiliated groups have lending or underwriting 
business with these firms. We expect two different effects on the stock liquidity. First, since 
relational institutions are more likely to obtain private information about their client firms from 
their affiliated banks, these client firms have higher probability of informed trading. Hence, 
market makers will request a higher bid-ask spread, thus reducing the liquidity of these stocks. 
This is similar to the adverse selection hypothesis mentioned above. This is can be regarded as 
the following hypothesis. 
H2a: All else are equal, firms with higher relationship institutions’ holdings will have lower 
liquidity. (Adverse selection hypothesis) 
On the other hand, when relationship institutions hold more shares of their client firms, they 
show confidence in the prospect of their client firms. This can signal the quality of these clients 
and provide a “certification effect”, which will enhance investors’ interests on these companies 
and improve their stock liquidity. This effect can be summarized as the following hypothesis.  
H2b: All else are equal, firms with higher relationship institutions’ holdings will have higher 
liquidity. (Certification effect hypothesis) 
The certification role of the financial institution has been widely documented in the 
literatures. For example, Puri (1996) shows that investors are willing to pay higher prices for 
securities underwritten by commercial banks than by investment banks since these securities are 
certificated by commercial banks. Therefore, it is an empirical question between certification 
effect and adverse selection problem.  
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Our study is related to the reseatch of Dass and Massa (2006). They argue that the 
privileged position of bank will increase information asymmetry and adverse selection for the 
stocks of borrowing firms. The information disadvantage reduces the incentive of other investors 
to trade the stocks. They find that a more intense relationship between financial conglomerates 
and borrowing firms increases the stock’s illiquidity and the information asymmetry, thus 
lowering the stock’s trading volume and the investment in the firm by institutional investors. 
Liquidity has many dimensions and most previous studies focus on the bid-ask spread and 
quote depth. In this paper, we examine three liquidity measures: Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective 
trading cost, Liu’s (2006) illiquidity measure (LM3) and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio to 
conduct the empirical study. Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective trading cost measure is based on 
Roll’s (1984) model while Hasbrouck uses the Gibbs sampling to estimate the effective trading 
cost. Liu’s (2006) LM3 measure8 is a new liquidity measure which captures multiple dimensions 
of liquidity. It uses infrequent trading information to proxy for illiquidity and effectively explains 
the cross-section stock return. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio focuses on price impact and is 
related to Kyle’s (1985) λ, the price change induced by order flow. The goal is to examine how 
relationship institutions affect stock liquidity of their clients in different dimensions.  
3.3 Data and Sample Description 
3.3.1 Data  
 The sample used in this study consists of all common stock listed in NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ during the period 1990-2004. We eliminate Prime, closed-end fund, real estate 
investment trust (REIT), American Depository Receipt (ADR) and foreign companies from this 
study. There are more observations (332,383 firm-quarters) than the first essay since we do not 
                                                 
8 Liu’s measure has been used in other studies including Lin, Singh and Yu (2009), Liu (2008) and Lin, Sanger and 
Yang (2007). 
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require sample firms to have 8 consecutive quarter earnings as we did when constructing SUE in 
the chapter 2. 
 There are three liquidity measures. The first one is Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs estimates9 
for liquidity, which is obtained from Roll’s (1984) model. The annual measure for the effective 
trading cost is highly correlated with effective spread measure based on intraday trading data. 
Compared to Roll’s effective spread10, this measure can overcome the estimation errors in the 
first-order serial covariance of returns. 
The second one is Liu’s (2006) illiquidity measure (LMx) defined as 
NoTD
x
Deflator
turnovermonthx 21]) /(1 monthsprior x in  mesdaily volu zero of[Number LMx ×−+=  (3.1) 
where x-month turnover is turnover over the previous x months, calculated as the sum of daily 
turnover over the previous x months; NoTD is the total number of trading days in the market 
over the prior x month. We choose LM3 to match the quarterly institutional holding data. LM3 is 
calculated at the end of each quarter for every stock. Infrequently traded stocks will have higher 
values for this measure. LM3 is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading 
volume over the 3 months. It captures multiple dimensions of liquidity (trading quantity, speed 
and cost) and places particular weight on trading speed, which most liquidity measures largely 
ignore. In practice, it is highly correlated with other liquidity measures such as bid-ask spread 
and turnover measures. 
The third liquidity measure is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio (price impact measure) 
which can be computed with the following equation:  
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9 We appreciate Joel Hasbrouck for providing the Gibbs estimate of effective trading cost on his website. 
10 We also use Roll’s (1984) effective spread to test the relationship and the conclusion does not change. 
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In equation 3.2, Daysi,q is the number of trading days for stock i in quarter q; Ri,q,d, pricei,q,d 
and Voli,q,d are the daily return, closing price and trading volume of stock i on day d of quarter q. 
This measure is the price response to one dollar of trading volume. Amihud (2002) and 
Hasbrouck (2009) claim that this measure is positively associated with high-frequency measures 
of price impact in microstructure data. Following the method of Dass and Massa (2006), we 
rescale this measure by a factor of 107 and take the logarithm. 
3.3.2 Description of the Sample 
Table 3.1 shows the firm characteristics of observations in this chapter, which do not require 
firms to have 8 consecutive quarter earnings. As shown in Panel A, firms held by relationship 
institutions tend to have better liquidity. For example, these connected firms have lower Roll’s 
effective spread, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, Hasbrouck’s trading cost measure and Liu’s 
illiquidity measure. This is consistent with the “certification effect hypothesis”. However, firms 
held by relational institutions also have more aggregate institutional holding. We can not rule out 
the possibility that this association may be caused by “information improvement hypothesis”. We 
need to control other variables in the regression model if we want to extract the true relationship 
between the stock liquidity and relationship institutions. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Fixed-Effects Regression Model  
In this section, we examine the impacts of institutional ownership on different liquidity 
measure. We rank the samples into quintiles according to total institutional holding. In Table 3.2, 
there is a monotonic and positive relationship between stock liquidity and institutional ownership. 
For example, firms with higher institutional ownership tend to have a smaller Amihud’s price 
impact measure, Hasbrouck’s effective trading cost measure and Liu’s illiquidity measure. This 
preliminary result suggests that although institutional investors have two different effects on the 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics 
 Mean Value Median Value 
 All Connected Unconnected Difference All Connected Unconnected Difference
Prc 17.85 25.16 14.40 10.75*** 12.63 20.20 9.88 10.33*** 
B/M 0.72 0.85 0.65 0.20*** 0.52 0.45 0.55 -0.10*** 
Leverage 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.00 0.55 0.57 0.53 0.04*** 
Turnover 0.3194 0.4316 0.2648 0.1668*** 0.1771 0.2659 0.1381 0.1278***
Cum_return 0.0558 0.0526 0.0574 -0.0048*** 0.0194 0.0275 0.0156 0.0119*** 
Var_return 0.0021 0.0017 0.0024 -0.0007*** 0.0010 0.0008 0.0012 -0.0004***
Herfin 171.54 224.18 145.22 78.96*** 93.09 157.22 63.29 93.93*** 
Numest 2.61 5.18 1.39 3.79*** 1.00 4.00 0.00 4.00*** 
Rollsp 0.0124 0.0074 0.0147 -0.0074*** 0.0078 0.0038 0.0104 -0.0067***
Illd 0.2996 -2.0899 1.4252 -3.5151*** 0.4513 -2.3954 1.6607 -4.0562***
LM3 5.1598 0.6719 7.2123 -6.5405*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001***
hasbrouck 0.0134 0.0064 0.0166 -0.0103*** 0.0075 0.0043 0.0108 -0.0065***
Number of observations 332,383 110,773 221,610  332,383 110,773 221,610  
This table presents the summary statistics for the sample of 332,383 firm-quarters for the liquidity study in chapter 3. 
All firms are divided into connected and unconnected companies, depending on whether their shares are held by 
relationship institutions whose affiliated banks have lending or underwriting relation with those companies. The 
definitions of variables are as followings: Prc is the stock price at the end of each quarter just prior to the earnings 
announcement; B/M is the book value divided by the market value; Leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market 
value of its equity plus the book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; Turnover is the trading 
volume turnover over the previous quarter; Cum_return is the accumulated monthly stock return over the previous 
quarter; Var_return is the variance of daily stock return over the previous quarter; Herfin is the Herfindahl index, 
which is calculated from all institutions’ holding and measures the concentration of ownership; Numest is the 
number of analyst following; Rollsp is the Roll’s (1984) effective spread; Illd is the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio 
which is rescaled by 107 and taken by logarithm; LM3 is Liu’s (2006) illiquidity measure; hasbrouck is Hasbrouck’s 
(2009) effective trading cost. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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Table 3.2 Relationship between Institutional Ownership and Liquidity 
 1 (lowest) 2 3 4 5 (highest) Difference (5-1) 
held_pct 3.09% 13.29% 27.58% 46.82% 72.62% 69.53%*** 
illd 3.030 1.752 0.458 -1.301 -2.962 -5.992*** 
LM3 11.835 6.655 3.288 1.163 0.434 -11.401*** 
hasbrouck 0.025 0.017 0.012 0.007 0.005 -0.02*** 
rollsp 0.021 0.015 0.011 0.007 0.005 -0.016*** 
rela_pct 0.14% 0.60% 1.26% 2.33% 5.14% 5.00%*** 
nonrela_pct 2.96% 12.70% 26.33% 44.49% 67.48% 64.52%*** 
ih1 0.63% 2.05% 4.06% 7.29% 10.23% 9.60%*** 
ih2 0.13% 0.64% 1.60% 3.25% 5.55% 5.42%*** 
ih3 0.26% 1.91% 4.80% 9.02% 17.57% 17.31%*** 
ih4 1.92% 7.80% 15.06% 23.40% 32.96% 31.04%*** 
ih5 0.16% 0.89% 2.07% 3.85% 6.31% 6.15%*** 
This table reports the relationship between the institutional holding and stock liquidity. All samples are divided into 
quintile according to the aggregate institutional holdings. Variables are defined as the followings: held_pct is the 
total holding of institutional investors; illd is the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity which is rescaled by 107 and taken by 
logarithm; LM3 is Liu’s (2006) illiquidity measure; hasbrouck is Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective trading cost; rollsp is 
the Roll’s (1984) effective spread; rela_pct and nonrela_pct are the holding of relationship and independent investors; 
ih1, ih2, ih3, ih4 and ih5 are the holding of banks, insurance companies, investment companies, investment advisors 
and other institutions in the firm. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
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information environment, the effect of information improvement is greater than that of adverse 
selection. This preliminary result is consistent with previous work of Jenning, Schnatterly and 
Seguin (2002) although they only use the NASDAQ firms.  
Next, we focus on the impact of relationship institutions on their clients’ stock liquidity with 
the Fixed-effects regression. The advantage of Fixed-effects regression is its ability to consider 
the unobserved firm effects. The dependant variables (Liqi) are Amihud’s price impact measure, 
Hasbrouck’s effective trading cost measure and Liu’s illiquidity measure respectively. 
The full model can be expressed as following: 
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 The main independent variables are as followings: 
held_pct: the aggregate percentage holding by all institutions. 
dum_rela: equal to 1 when the firm is a connected firm and 0 when the firm is unconnected. 
rela_pct: the aggregate percentage holding by relationship institutions. 
Stock liquidity may be related to firm’s other characteristics. Following the previous 
literatures, we also control the following variables in the regression: leverage level, past stock 
return, stock price, firm size, book-to-market ratio, stock trading volume turnover, return 
volatility, Herfindahl index, the number of analyst followings and advertising cost. 
The definitions of these control variables are: 
leverage: firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity plus the book value of debt and 
preferred stock minus deferred tax. 
cum_return: the three-month cumulative return before the announcement. 
prc: the stock price at the end of each quarter just prior to its earnings announcement. 
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lnsize: the log market value of each firm at the end of each quarter just prior to its earnings 
announcement. 
B/M: the book value divided by the market value at the end of each quarter prior to the earnings 
announcement. 
turnover: the trading volume turnover in the previous quarter. 
var_return: the variance of return in previous quarter. 
herfin: the Herfindahl index, which is calculated from all institutions’ holding and measures the 
concentration of ownership. 
numest: the number of analyst followings before the announcement. 
advertising: the advertising expense divided by total asset. 
Table 3.3 reports the correlation matrix between explanatory variables in the Fixed-effects 
regressions. It shows firm size is positively related to institutional holding, stock price and 
analyst followings. Also, whether firm is connected is positively related to the aggregate 
institutional holdings. 
3.4.2 Regression of Hasbrouck’s Effective Trading Cost Measure 
Table 3.4 presents the result for Hasbrouck’s trading cost measure. Panel A and B show the 
results for NYSE & AMEX firms and NASDAQ firms respectively. Since institutions tend to 
buy high liquidity stocks, potential endogenous problem may exist between liquidity and 
institutional holding. Following Kale and Loon (2008), we use Ranks11 as the instrument 
variable for institutional holding (held_pct) to solve the potential endogenous problem between 
institutional holding and stock liquidity. The instrument variable needs to be valid and relevant. 
When we use Ranks, the F statistics of the joint significance in the first stage equation are all 
greater than 10, suggesting Ranks is a suitable instrument variable for institutional holdings.   
                                                 
11 RANK is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock has an S&P stock ranking (Compustat item #282) and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3.3 Correlation Matrix of Explanatory Variables 
 held_pct dum_rela rela_pct leverage cum_return prc lnsize B/M turnover var_return herfin numest advertising
held_pct 1.00             
dum_rela 0.46 1.00            
rela_pct 0.22 0.31 1.00           
leverage -0.03 0.00 0.01 1.00          
cum_return -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.00 1.00         
prc 0.39 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.10 1.00        
lnsize 0.66 0.51 0.17 0.02 0.05 0.59 1.00       
B/M 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00      
turnover 0.18 0.14 0.06 -0.07 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.00 1.00     
var_return -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.13 -0.12 -0.17 0.00 0.12 1.00    
herfin 0.45 0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.12 0.00 0.00 -0.03 1.00   
numest 0.51 0.40 0.12 0.00 -0.02 0.38 0.67 0.00 0.17 -0.08 0.05 1.00  
advertising -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 1.00 
The table presents the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables in the regression analysis. The definitions of all variables 
are as follows: held_pct is the aggregate institutional holding; dum_rela is 1 if a firm’s share is held by relationship institutions 
whose affiliated banks have lent or underwritten for the firm within 3 years and 0 otherwise; rela_pct is the aggregate holdings of 
relationship institutions; leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity plus the book value of debt and 
preferred stock minus deferred tax; cum_return is stock return over the previous quarter; prc is the stock price at the end of each 
quarter just prior to the earnings announcement; lnsize is the logarithm of market capitalization; B/M is the book value divided by 
the market value; turnover is trading volume turnover; var_return is the variance of return in previous quarter; herfin is the 
Herfindahl index; numest is the number of analyst following; advertising is advertising expense divided by total asset. 
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  For NYSE & AMEX firms in panel A, the coefficients on held_pct in all models are 
negative and significant, indicating that effective trading cost decreases with institutional 
holdings. This is consistent with information improvement hypothesis: firms with higher 
institutional holdings will have better liquidity. On the contrary, the coefficient (0.000651) on the 
dummy variable (dum_rela) in model 1 is positive and significant, indicating that firms held by 
relationship institutions on average have higher trading cost. This is consistent with the adverse 
selection hypothesis. Market maker will request a higher spread when they have a higher 
probability to trade with informed relationship institutions. Because the mean value of 
Hasbrouck’s estimate is 0.0134 (from table 3.1), connected firms have 4.86% higher trading cost 
than unconnected firms.12  
 In model 2, we examine whether stock liquidity decrease with the holding level of 
relationship institutions. Since the coefficient on rela_pct is positive and significant (0.000975), 
stock trading costs will be 0.073%13 higher if relationship institutions increase 1% shares. This 
is also consistent with adverse selection hypothesis. In model 3, we add dummy variable 
(dum_rela) and relationship institution’s holding (rela_pct) into the regression, both of the 
coefficients are positive and significant.   
 We find similar results for Nasdaq firms in Panel B. The coefficients on held_pct in all three 
models are negative and significant, which is consistent with the information improvement 
hypothesis. Furthermore, the coefficients on dum_rela are all positive and significant, confirming 
the adverse selection hypothesis. From model 1, connected Nasdaq firms have 4.61%14 higher 
trading cost than unconnected firms. 
 
                                                 
12 0.000651/0.0134=4.86% 
13 0.000975/0.0134*1%=0.073% 
14 0.00618/0.0134=4.61% 
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Table 3.4 Fixed-Effects Model of Hasbrouck’s Effective Trading Cost Measure 
Model  (1) (2) (3)
Panel A: NYSE & AMEX 
held_pct -0.00782*** -0.00722*** -0.00806*** 
 (-5.07) (-4.77) (-5.05) 
dum_rela 0.000651***  0.000634*** 
 (8.11)  (8.18) 
rela_pct  0.000975*** 0.000683*** 
  (3.81) (2.87) 
leverage -0.000127*** -0.000114*** -0.000128*** 
 (-3.39) (-3.03) (-3.42) 
cum_return -0.00179*** -0.00182*** -0.00179*** 
 (-26.61) (-26.33) (-26.37) 
prc 0.0000139*** 0.0000132*** 0.0000139*** 
 (11.98) (11.51) (11.98) 
lnsize -0.00136*** -0.00132*** -0.00135*** 
 (-14.50) (-13.41) (-14.18) 
B/M 0.00000856*** 0.00000889*** 0.00000851*** 
 (2.64) (2.74) (2.62) 
turnover -0.000378** -0.000396** -0.000375** 
 (-2.29) (-2.42) (-2.27) 
var_return 0.348*** 0.357*** 0.348*** 
 (35.09) (36.74) (35.13) 
herfin 0.00000116*** 0.00000106*** 0.00000119*** 
 (4.10) (3.82) (4.11) 
numest 0.0000970*** 0.0000974*** 0.0000969*** 
 (11.53) (11.55) (11.52) 
advertising 0.00236*** 0.00204*** 0.00236*** 
 (3.05) (2.63) (3.05) 
firm-quarter 102752 102752 102752 
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(table 3.4 continued) 
Panel B: NASDAQ 
held_pct -0.197*** -0.206*** -0.208*** 
 (-28.09) (-27.10) (-26.98) 
dum_rela 0.00618***  0.00535*** 
 (21.83)  (19.82) 
rela_pct  0.0308*** 0.0250*** 
  (21.03) (19.18) 
leverage -0.00205*** -0.00242*** -0.00224*** 
 (-7.93) (-8.89) (-8.28) 
cum_return -0.00485*** -0.00520*** -0.00513*** 
 (-26.77) (-26.35) (-26.17) 
prc 0.000114*** 0.000112*** 0.000117*** 
 (20.86) (19.73) (20.53) 
lnsize 0.00970*** 0.0107*** 0.0104*** 
 (18.35) (18.30) (18.07) 
B/M 0.00587*** 0.00641*** 0.00618*** 
 (25.76) (25.30) (25.04) 
turnover 0.00129*** 0.00144*** 0.00141*** 
 (12.12) (12.75) (12.53) 
var_return 0.0640*** 0.0728*** 0.0669*** 
 (6.71) (7.40) (6.76) 
herfin 0.0000630*** 0.0000657*** 0.0000661*** 
 (27.01) (26.11) (26.02) 
numest 0.00197*** 0.00207*** 0.00201*** 
 (29.53) (28.56) (28.45) 
advertising -0.000419 -0.000934 -0.000513 
 (-0.31) (-0.67) (-0.37) 
firm-quarter 158096 158096 158096 
This table reports the Fixed-Effects Model of Hasbrouck’s Effective Trading Cost Measure. The result of NYSE and AMEX 
firms is presented in Panel A, and the result of NASDAQ firms is shown in Panel B. Following Kale and Loon (2008), we use 
Rank as the instrument variable for institutional holding (held_pct) to solve the potential endogenous problem between liquidity 
and institutional holdings. RANK is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock has an S&P stock ranking (Compustat item #282) 
and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is Hasbrouck’s (2009) effective trading cost estimate. The definitions of independent 
variables are as followings: held_pct is the aggregate institutional holding; dum_rela is 1 if firms’ shares are held by relationship 
institutions whose affiliated banks have lent or underwritten for the firms within 3 years and 0 otherwise; rela_pct is the 
aggregate holdings of relationship institutions; leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity plus the book 
value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; cum_return is stock return over the previous quarter; prc is the stock price 
at each quarter; lnsize is the logarithm of market capitalization; B/M is the book value divided by the market value; turnover is 
trading volume turnover; var_return is the variance of return in previous quarter; herfin is the Herfindahl index; numest is the 
number of analyst following; advertising is advertising expense divided by total asset. Regression intercepts are suppressed for 
brevity. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 
 
   
 75
3.4.3 Regression of Liu’s LM3 Measure  
 Table 3.5 shows the Fixed-effects regression of Liu’s LM3 measure. For the NYSE and 
AMEX firms in Panel A, the coefficients on held_pct in all models are negative but not 
significant. This can be explained by the fact that most NYSE and AMEX firms have trading 
everyday and institutional holding may not have much improvement for LM3, which focus on 
the number of non-trading days. Consistent with adverse selection hypothesis, the coefficient of 
dum_rela is positive and significant (0.27) in model 1. Because the average LM3 is 5.1598 (from 
Table 3.1) for all observations, connected firms on average have 5.23%15 higher LM3 for NYSE 
and AMEX firms. In model 2 and model 3, the coefficients on rela_pct are positive and 
significant, indicating that firms with higher relationship institutions’ holdings exhibit lower 
liquidity. These findings are consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis. 
 For Nasdaq firms in Panel B, the information improvement is more prominent since the 
coefficients on held_pct are all negative and significant. Because most Nasdaq firms are smaller 
and have more non-trading days, the prices of stocks with higher institutional holdings reflect the 
information faster, thus improving the non-trading problems. From model 1, the coefficient on 
dum_rela is positive and significant (1.226), which is consistent with the adverse selection 
hypothesis. It seems that higher information asymmetry for Nasdaq firms makes investors to be 
more cautious about trading stocks held by relationship institutions. On average, connected firms 
have 23.76%16 higher LM3 than unconnected firms without holdings by relationship institutions. 
Furthermore, model 2 and model 3 show that higher relationship holdings result in more 
non-trading days for connected firms. All these findings indicate that the impact of adverse 
selection is greater in Nasdaq firms. 
                                                 
15 0.27/5.1598=5.23% 
16 1.226/5.1598=23.76% 
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Table 3.5 Fixed-Effects Model of Liu’s LM3 Measure 
Model  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: NYSE & AMEX   
held_pct -1.097 -0.998 -1.378 
 (-1.00) (-0.93) (-1.22) 
dum_rela 0.270***  0.250*** 
 (5.00)  (4.80) 
rela_pct  0.843*** 0.725*** 
  (5.07) (4.71) 
leverage -0.0204 -0.0162 -0.0218 
 (-0.79) (-0.63) (-0.85) 
cum_return -0.549*** -0.565*** -0.560*** 
 (-11.90) (-11.93) (-11.93) 
prc 0.00965*** 0.00936*** 0.00968*** 
 (12.34) (12.14) (12.36) 
lnsize -1.206*** -1.188*** -1.196*** 
 (-17.90) (-16.99) (-17.43) 
B/M -0.00161 -0.00150 -0.00165 
 (-0.70) (-0.66) (-0.72) 
turnover -0.630*** -0.636*** -0.628*** 
 (-5.89) (-5.99) (-5.86) 
var_return -42.12*** -40.35*** -42.25*** 
 (-9.36) (-9.10) (-9.38) 
herfin 0.000646*** 0.000613*** 0.000675*** 
 (3.12) (3.06) (3.20) 
numest 0.0944*** 0.0945*** 0.0946*** 
 (16.06) (16.06) (16.05) 
advertising 2.886*** 2.779*** 2.885*** 
 (5.70) (5.47) (5.70) 
firm-quarter 113635 113635 113635 
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(table 3.5 continued) 
Panel B: NASDAQ 
held_pct -42.21*** -44.04*** -44.72*** 
 (-19.91) (-19.87) (-19.72) 
dum_rela 1.226***  0.997*** 
 (14.31)  (12.44) 
rela_pct  7.168*** 6.059*** 
  (17.28) (16.41) 
leverage -0.215*** -0.287*** -0.266*** 
 (-2.69) (-3.50) (-3.24) 
cum_return -0.933*** -1.010*** -1.002*** 
 (-16.57) (-16.94) (-16.83) 
prc 0.0557*** 0.0555*** 0.0565*** 
 (32.58) (32.13) (32.30) 
lnsize 0.278* 0.457*** 0.434*** 
 (1.85) (2.86) (2.72) 
B/M 1.365*** 1.446*** 1.421*** 
 (24.55) (24.32) (24.28) 
turnover 0.0983*** 0.132*** 0.126*** 
 (2.97) (3.86) (3.69) 
var_return -17.17*** -15.18*** -16.47*** 
 (-5.89) (-5.15) (-5.55) 
herfin 0.0139*** 0.0144*** 0.0146*** 
 (20.21) (20.13) (19.99) 
numest 0.558*** 0.580*** 0.572*** 
 (27.34) (26.77) (26.83) 
advertising -0.772* -0.881** -0.799* 
 (-1.87) (-2.11) (-1.90) 
firm-quarter 185707 185707 185707 
This table reports the Fixed-effects model of Liu’s LM3 Measure. The result of NYSE and AMEX firms is presented in Panel A, 
and the result of NASDAQ firms is shown in Panel B. Following Kale and Loon (2008), we use Rank as the instrument variable 
for institutional holding (held_pct) to solve the potential endogenous problem between liquidity and institutional holdings. RANK 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock has an S&P stock ranking (Compustat item #282) and 0 otherwise. The dependent 
variable is Liu’s (2006) LM3 measure. The definitions of independent variables are as followings: held_pct is the aggregate 
institutional holding; dum_rela is 1 if firms’ shares are held by relationship institutions whose affiliated banks have lent or 
underwritten for the firms within 3 years and 0 otherwise; rela_pct is the aggregate holdings of relationship institutions; leverage 
is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity plus the book value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; 
cum_return is stock return over the previous quarter; prc is the stock price at each quarter; lnsize is the logarithm of market 
capitalization; B/M is the book value divided by the market value; turnover is trading volume turnover; var_return is the variance 
of return in previous quarter; herfin is the Herfindahl index; numest is the number of analyst following; advertising is advertising 
expense divided by total asset. Regression intercepts are suppressed for brevity. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the symbols: *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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3.4.4 Regression of Amihud’s Illiquidity Measure 
 Table 3.6 presents the result for Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, which measures the price impact. 
The coefficients on held_pct in panel A are all negative and significant, supporting the 
information improvement hypothesis. On average, firms with more institutional holding have 
less price impact. From model 1, the coefficient on dum_rela is positive but not significant. The 
coefficient on rela_pct is negative and significant (model 2 and 3), which supports the 
certification effect. That connected firms with more relationship institutions have less price 
impact may also be related to price support behavior found in chapter 2. Firms with more 
relationship institutions can absorb the selling pressures and have smaller price impact.  
 On Panel B, the coefficients on held_pct are all negative and significant, consistent with 
information improvement hypothesis. The coefficient on dum_rela is positive and significant 
(0.0739), which supports the adverse selection hypothesis. Although the certification effect helps 
to reduce the price impact, the adverse selection problem has more influence on Nasdaq-listed 
firms, which are smaller and have higher information asymmetry. 
3.4.5 Robustness Check: Different Size Levels  
 To examine whether the findings of liquidity are robust, we divide the whole sample firms 
into tertiles based on the average asset during the research period to control the firm size. We run 
the Fixed-effects regression as in Table 3.4-3.6 for every size tertile and collect the results in 
Table 3.7. For brevity, only the coefficients on held_pct, dum_rela and rela_pct are presented. 
From Panel A, all coefficients on held_pct are negative and significant in every size tertile, which 
strongly supports the information improvement hypothesis. Furthermore, the finding that all 
coefficients on dum_rela and rela_pct are positive and significant confirms the adverse selection 
hypothesis. On average, connected firms whose shares are held by relationship institutions will 
have higher trading cost.  
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             Table 3.6 Fixed-Effects Model of Amihud’s Illiquidity Measure 
Model  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: NYSE & AMEX   
held_pct -4.346*** -4.176*** -4.214*** 
 (-20.28) (-20.15) (-19.18) 
dum_rela 0.0142  0.0243** 
 (1.36)  (2.45) 
rela_pct  -0.312*** -0.324*** 
  (-10.20) (-11.47) 
leverage -0.0110** -0.00980** -0.0103** 
 (-2.18) (-1.97) (-2.08) 
cum_return -0.302*** -0.298*** -0.297*** 
 (-33.57) (-32.52) (-32.73) 
prc -0.000651*** -0.000689*** -0.000659*** 
 (-4.26) (-4.62) (-4.34) 
lnsize -1.097*** -1.101*** -1.102*** 
 (-83.03) (-81.33) (-82.55) 
B/M -0.000284 -0.000252 -0.000265 
 (-0.64) (-0.57) (-0.60) 
turnover -0.856*** -0.857*** -0.856*** 
 (-41.52) (-42.35) (-41.86) 
var_return 13.55*** 13.84*** 13.65*** 
 (15.44) (16.16) (15.65) 
herfin 0.000931*** 0.000910*** 0.000916*** 
 (23.02) (23.44) (22.42) 
numest 0.00421*** 0.00392*** 0.00393*** 
 (3.64) (3.40) (3.40) 
advertising 0.297*** 0.288*** 0.298*** 
 (3.02) (2.94) (3.05) 
firm-quarter 114393 114393 114393 
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(table 3.6 continued) 
Panel B: NASDAQ 
held_pct -6.619*** -6.602*** -6.665*** 
 (-20.04) (-19.46) (-19.14) 
dum_rela 0.0739***  0.0697*** 
 (5.59)  (5.75) 
rela_pct  0.179*** 0.100* 
  (2.94) (1.86) 
leverage -0.0706*** -0.0725*** -0.0716*** 
 (-5.72) (-5.81) (-5.74) 
cum_return -0.361*** -0.362*** -0.362*** 
 (-41.00) (-39.48) (-39.51) 
prc 0.00388*** 0.00382*** 0.00389*** 
 (14.51) (14.37) (14.48) 
lnsize -1.051*** -1.048*** -1.048*** 
 (-45.29) (-43.09) (-43.11) 
B/M 0.172*** 0.175*** 0.173*** 
 (20.54) (19.81) (19.89) 
turnover -0.280*** -0.280*** -0.280*** 
 (-54.27) (-53.10) (-53.25) 
var_return 8.650*** 8.764*** 8.660*** 
 (19.03) (19.33) (19.03) 
herfin 0.00218*** 0.00218*** 0.00219*** 
 (20.34) (19.81) (19.53) 
numest 0.0225*** 0.0233*** 0.0228*** 
 (7.06) (6.97) (6.93) 
advertising -0.234*** -0.241*** -0.235*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.74) (-3.64) 
firm-quarter 186592 186592 186592 
This table reports the Fixed-effects model of Amihud’s Illiquidity Measure. The result of NYSE and AMEX firms is presented in 
Panel A, and the result of NASDAQ firms is shown in Panel B. Following Kale and Loon (2008), we use Rank as the instrument 
variable for institutional holding (held_pct) to solve the potential endogenous problem between liquidity and institutional 
holdings. RANK is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a stock has an S&P stock ranking (Compustat item #282) and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable is AmiHud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio rescaled by 107 and taken by logarithm. The definitions of independent 
variables are as followings: held_pct is the aggregate institutional holding; dum_rela is 1 if firms’ shares are held by relationship 
institutions whose affiliated banks have lent or underwritten for the firms within 3 years and 0 otherwise; rela_pct is the 
aggregate holdings of relationship institutions; leverage is firm’s total debt divided by market value of its equity plus the book 
value of debt and preferred stock minus deferred tax; cum_return is stock return over the previous quarter; prc is the stock price 
at each quarter; lnsize is the logarithm of market capitalization; B/M is the book value divided by the market value; turnover is 
trading volume turnover; var_return is the variance of return in previous quarter; herfin is the Herfindahl index; numest is the 
number of analyst following; advertising is advertising expense divided by total asset. T-statistics are in parenthesis and the 
symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
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 Table 3.7 Fixed-Effects Model (Different Size Levels) 
 Small Size Median Size Large Size 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Hasbrouck’s effective trading cost measure 
held_pct -0.548*** -0.577*** -0.578*** -0.0684*** -0.0691*** -0.0705*** -0.0451*** -0.0456*** -0.0465*** 
 (-13.01) (-12.46) (-12.42) (-28.51) (-28.30) (-28.09) (-27.27) (-27.00) (-26.82) 
dum_rela 0.00847***  0.00261*** 0.00240***  0.00212*** 0.00187***  0.00176*** 
 (8.21)  (3.03) (17.05)  (15.56) (21.37)  (20.62) 
rela_pct  0.114*** 0.107***  0.0102*** 0.00803***  0.00523*** 0.00426*** 
  (10.43) (10.18)  (15.04) (12.49)  (18.70) (16.69) 
Panel B: Liu’s LM3 
held_pct -66.86*** -71.18*** -71.14*** -5.397*** -5.698*** -5.651*** -43.98*** -44.36*** -45.76*** 
 (-8.84) (-8.83) (-8.78) (-4.74) (-4.97) (-4.81) (-27.66) (-27.56) (-27.22) 
dum_rela 0.783***  -0.0498 -0.0213  -0.0590 1.959***  1.831*** 
 (4.38)  (-0.33) (-0.33)  (-0.96) (23.82)  (22.67) 
rela_pct  14.43*** 14.56***  0.886*** 0.949***  5.857*** 4.867*** 
  (8.50) (8.97)  (3.02) (3.44)  (22.84) (20.69) 
Panel C: Amihud illiquidity measure 
held_pct -6.381*** -6.305*** -6.370*** -3.927*** -3.794*** -3.832*** -8.155*** -8.073*** -8.170*** 
 (-5.98) (-5.67) (-5.68) (-19.13) (-18.44) (-18.11) (-30.92) (-30.71) (-29.91) 
dum_rela 0.0467*  0.0491** 0.0307***  0.0446*** 0.119***  0.118*** 
 (1.87)  (2.43) (2.69)  (4.10) (8.86)  (9.14) 
rela_pct  0.0868 -0.0375  -0.270*** -0.318***  0.103*** 0.0367 
  (0.38) (-0.17)  (-5.35) (-6.72)  (2.59) (1.02) 
This table reports the Fixed-effects model for all observations in different size tertiles. The regression model specification is the 
same as in Table 3.4-3.6. Following Kale and Loon (2008), we use Rank as the instrument variable for institutional holding 
(held_pct) to solve the potential endogenous problem between liquidity and institutional holdings. For brevity, we only present 
the coefficients on held_pct, dum_rela and rela_pct. The dependent variables in Panel A, B, and C are Hasbrouck’s effective 
trading cost measure, Liu’s LM3 measure and Amihud’s illiquidity measure. Numbers in parentheses are t-value. The symbols: *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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 We find similar results in Liu’s Lm3 illiquidity measure in Panel B. The coefficients on 
rela_pct are positive and significant in all size tertiles, which shows a positive relationship 
between illiquidity and relationship institutions’ holding levels. Investors tend to avoid trading 
stocks held by more relationship institutions. In Panel C, we still find a strong evidence for 
adverse selection hypothesis in Amihud’s illiquidity measure since most of the coefficients on 
dum_rela and rela_pct are positive and significant. 
3.4.6 Robustness Check: Different Institutional Holding Levels 
 In Table 3.8, we run the Fixed-effects regression for observations in different institutional 
holding levels. We use the same regression models as in Table 3.4-3.6 and only present the 
coefficients on held_pct, dum_rela and rela_pct. There is still a negative relation between 
illiquidity and institutional holding levels (held_pct) in all holding levels, which supports the 
information improvement hypothesis. Our interest is the impact of relationship institutions on 
liquidity. For Hasbrouck’s trading cost in Panel A, the coefficients on dum_rela and rela_pct in 
different holding groups are positive and significant, which supports the adverse selection 
hypothesis. For Liu’s LM3 measure in Panel B, most of them are also positive and significant. 
For Amihud’s illiquidity measures, we still find evidences that support adverse selection 
hypothesis. When the total institutional holding increases to median and high levels, the adverse 
selection problem for relationship institutions get some relief since prices should incorporate 
information more quickly when firms are held by more institutions. 
3.5 Conclusion 
 Institutional investors play an important role in the stock liquidity. Stock liquidity can be 
improved when firms are held by more institutional investors since the competition among 
institutions can create better information environment and attract more investors. On the 
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Table 3.8 Fixed-Effects Model (Different Institutional Holding Levels) 
 Low Holding Median Holding High Holding 
Model (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Hasbrouck’s effective trading cost measure 
held_pct -0.999*** -1.039*** -1.040*** -0.128*** -0.132*** -0.134*** -0.0271*** -0.0273*** -0.0277*** 
 (-12.74) (-12.36) (-12.31) (-25.83) (-25.35) (-25.14) (-26.20) (-26.02) (-25.92) 
dum_rela 0.00729***  0.000305 0.00332***  0.00231*** 0.00100***  0.000952*** 
 (6.80)  (0.32) (16.66)  (12.74) (16.46)  (15.95) 
rela_pct  0.172*** 0.171***  0.0288*** 0.0250***  0.00239*** 0.00186*** 
  (9.63) (9.43)  (18.60) (17.12)  (12.62) (10.46) 
Panel B: Liu’s LM3 
held_pct -272.0*** -287.6*** -284.7*** -23.39*** -24.43*** -24.64*** -4.029*** -4.259*** -4.264*** 
 (-13.02) (-12.72) (-12.69) (-12.53) (-12.69) (-12.56) (-8.14) (-8.55) (-8.36) 
dum_rela 1.925***  -0.907*** 0.463***  0.218*** 0.0265  0.00815 
 (6.16)  (-3.44) (6.15)  (3.24) (0.94)  (0.30) 
rela_pct  66.19*** 70.68***  5.956*** 5.578***  0.607*** 0.603*** 
  (10.64) (11.12)  (10.62) (10.64)  (7.21) (7.67) 
Panel C: Amihud illiquidity measure 
held_pct -11.61*** -11.79*** -11.86*** -6.136*** -6.159*** -6.177*** -4.788*** -4.651*** -4.657*** 
 (-6.51) (-6.23) (-6.29) (-18.46) (-17.95) (-17.67) (-30.38) (-29.69) (-28.99) 
dum_rela 0.0713***  0.0182 0.0248*  0.0170 -0.00178  0.00885 
 (2.69)  (0.85) (1.87)  (1.45) (-0.20)  (1.02) 
rela_pct  1.354** 1.265**  0.190** 0.160*  -0.308*** -0.313*** 
  (2.53) (2.27)  (1.98) (1.78)  (-12.17) (-13.28) 
This table reports the Fixed-effects model for all observations in different institutional holding tertiles. The regression model 
specification is the same as in Table 3.4-3.6. Following Kale and Loon (2008), we use Rank as the instrument variable for 
institutional holding (held_pct) to solve the potential endogenous problem between liquidity and institutional holdings. For 
brevity, we only present the coefficients on held_pct, dum_rela and rela_pct. The dependent variables in Panel A, B, and C are 
Hasbrouck’s effective trading cost measure, Liu’s LM3 measure, Amihud’s illiquidity measure. Numbers in parentheses are 
t-value. The symbols: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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contrary, the higher adverse selection cost can reduce the liquidity of stocks owned by more 
informed institutional investors. 
 In this chapter, we study the influence on the stock liquidity when firms are held by their 
relationship institutions. Consistent with information improvement hypothesis, firms with higher 
aggregated institutional holdings exhibit better liquidity. However, due to the adverse selection 
problem, firms with higher relationship institutions’ holdings exhibit lower liquidity. Specifically, 
these firms have higher trading cost, more non-trading days and larger price impact. The 
deterioration of the stock liquidity can result from the fact that market makers will charge a 
wider bid-ask spread when facing a higher probability of trading with informed relationship 
institutions.  
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examines the impacts on the stock markets when financial institutions hold 
their clients’ stocks. Analyzing the earnings announcements of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ stocks 
from 1990 to 2004, we find that relationship institutions (that have lent/underwritten and hold 
shares of client firms) significantly support client firms when their clients have negative earnings 
surprises. Such price supports effectively reduce the negative price swings and the earnings 
momentum. Furthermore, we find a negative relationship between stock liquidity and 
relationship institutional holdings. Firms with higher relationship institutions’ holdings suffer 
more from the adverse selection problem and have lower stock liquidity in terms of higher 
trading cost, more non-trading days and larger price impact. 
This dissertation contributes to literature on financial institutions by studying the 
non-intermediary role of financial institutions in the capital markets with a broad sample of firms 
and a regular earnings announcement event. The finding provides general implications not only 
for the financial institution literature but also for the asset pricing literature. Firms without active 
institutional relationships can be considered a risk factor because supportive institutions can 
effectively convey a positive signal to mitigate clients’ negative earnings surprises through their 
stock buying activities. Such supports alter stock return profiles and smooth temporary negative 
shocks. By reducing unnecessary price movements, financial institutions mitigate the noise in the 
market. However, they may also impose a negative effect on client firms’ stock liquidity because 
of the higher adverse selection costs.  
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